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| Posted by: Madman
- [43410119] Wed, Oct 20, 2004, 13:46
I just subscribed to the National Review explicitly to get this article. I'll post it in entirity b/c it is a paid subscription. It's not perfect.
This forum, like much of the media, seems to be concentrating on crticisms of the war and occupation as articulated by the left. (I'm not arguing bias here, there are many reasons for this focus). But if a diversity of perspective provides value, then criticisms as articulated by the right should be heard, as well. This is one such critique.
(I should point out, however, that I'm not sure I agree with the characterization of "wrong" here; I think the issue itself has been framed by the left).
What Went Wrong?
The miscalculations and missteps that led to the current situation in Iraq
RICHARD LOWRY
By now, anyone who can't recite the standard critique of what has gone wrong in the Iraq war just hasn't been paying attention.
It goes something like this: There was no post-war planning. What little planning took place was spearheaded by the State Department, and then maliciously ignored by the ideologues at the Pentagon, who didn't want to hear a discouraging word about managing a liberated Iraq. Consumed by Rumsfeld's fixation on light forces, the Pentagon skimped on troop levels and ignored the advice of its commanders. Anyone who said anything inconvenient about the war was systematically punished. In this narrative, "Pentagon civilian" becomes a dirty phrase.
Almost every particular of this indictment is wrong. It has been created by liberal journalists such as James Fallows and David Rieff (with the help of disgruntled State Department leakers), entered the slipstream of conventional wisdom, and been repeated endlessly by John Kerry in the presidential campaign. These critics start from the premise that if a sparrow falls somewhere in Iraq, it must be the Pentagon's fault.
In fact, if one is playing a 20/20 second-guessing game over Iraq, the pure Defense Department pre-war vision that wasn't implemented would have avoided one of the pitfalls of what transpired: an occupation that alienated Iraqis and gave the U.S. sole control and responsibility over events in Iraq. The Pentagon favored the creation of an Iraqi government even before the invasion. And it pushed from the very beginning for a serious effort to train indigenous Iraqi forces, which would have given us a head start on what is now the consensus solution to Iraq's woes: that very training, so that Iraqis can carry on the fight for their country themselves.
Obviously, mistakes have been made in Iraq, including by the Pentagon. The story of the Iraq post-war is, in part, a tale of gross intelligence failures, debilitating intramural battles, miscommunications, unintended consequences, and counterproductive half-measures. Some of these missteps were the result of the inevitable uncertainties and surprises of warfare, others of incompetence, and many of something in between. What follows is drawn from interviews with current and former officials from across the U.S. government: from Defense, State, the National Security Council, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). (Because of the sensitivity of the matters discussed, most everyone insisted on anonymity.)
If the picture portrayed here of Iraq operations is distressing, it isn't because these sources were, or are, doubters about the Iraq war. They all supported it, and continue to do so. Many conservative defenders of the Bush administration have taken to shrugging in reaction to the course of events in Iraq, "Things always go wrong in warfare." They do, but failing to examine the specific ways they went wrong is a cop-out. A look at the record in Iraq means confronting this hard fact: The Bush administration didn't know what it was getting into in Iraq, and then found itself stumbling into exactly the sort of heavy-handed occupation many American officials had wanted to avoid.
'A QUICK COLLAPSE SAVES LIVES'
The level of troops in Iraq has been a constant source of contention, and a constant point of criticism of the Pentagon. Left and Right alike have argued that in invading with 150,000 troops, the administration didn't have adequate numbers to do the job. But every strategic choice has its benefits and drawbacks. If more troops would have enhanced security in the aftermath of the war (a debatable proposition, as we will see), the lighter and more mobile force had significant advantages in the prosecution of it. "The decision was made to collapse the regime as quickly and violently as possible," says a senior administration official. The most important advantage of this approach, he says, was simple: "A quick collapse saves American lives and Iraqi lives."
It served other objectives as well. It made it possible to take the oilfields — crucial to Iraq's rebuilding — mostly intact before Saddam had time to destroy them. And there was the political consideration. It was thought important to avoid a drawn-out war, and the destabilizing effect it might have on the region. "You don't want an American army slogging its way to an Arab capital," is how one official puts it. Another official familiar with the planning explains, "We identified a large number of risks, many of which quite obviously would have been made worse — graver, more likely to happen — if the war were prolonged, and if we could not achieve tactical surprise."
Amazingly enough, the U.S. did achieve such surprise. "Tommy Franks had 200,000 troops on the border of a country and still achieved tactical surprise when he invaded," a former defense official says. "When has that ever happened before?" We gained that advantage by suffering a significant diplomatic setback. We had wanted to send the 4th Infantry Division through Turkey to northern Iraq. Turkey refused — so the war began with the 4th Infantry Division still sitting in the Mediterranean.
"Saddam knew we were coming," says one official. "But he didn't know when. It appears that Saddam thought that we weren't going to start the war without the 4th Infantry Division. There were spools of wire and explosive material for bridges and for oil facilities that had been deployed to the area but were not yet hooked up. This showed the intention — but also that they thought they had time. That's pretty powerful evidence of surprise."
The theory of the war itself was borne out close to exactly. "We thought the regime was fairly brittle," an official explains. "If we got past the major Iraqi forces in the south and along [Saddam's] lines of communication closer to Baghdad, we could fracture the regime and not meet head-on his heaviest forces. Saddam would not be able to command and control those formations. That's what happened."
'PROBABLY TOO GRACIOUS IN OUR VICTORY'
And that's when things began to go wrong. The brilliant and successful war plan had unintended consequences. "You collapse the regime so quickly that the army, the security apparatus, ends up reconstituting because you didn't defeat it," an official says. The inadvertent Turkey gambit had its cost, too. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. Richard Myers has said publicly that coming through Turkey to drive into the Sunni Triangle in force "would have helped somewhat with the current situation." Privately, officials are more categorical. One says, "I think we are paying for that to this day."
Bush critics would never put it this way, but a failing of the invasion plan turned out to be its excess of humanitarianism. "We wanted this to be as humane as a combat operation — as war — can be," General Myers told the Senate Armed Services Committee in June. "[The idea was] to let regular Iraqi divisions [go], while destroying equipment and some of their people. If they melted away, then let them melt away, because they were conscripts, after all. So if there is a blame here, it was making some assumptions on how the Iraqi people would react to that, and I would submit we were probably too gracious in our victory in hindsight."
This is a recurring theme. Over and over again in Iraq, the administration would demonstrate a lack of the necessary toughness to succeed: in how it conducted the initial war, how it handled the post-war looting, and how it approached the problem of restive cities such as Fallujah. Even in the post-war planning, it was the soft side of the enterprise, the potential humanitarian crisis, that was given priority. In Iraq, the conciliatory gesture, the half-measure, took priority over the work of smashing the enemy and establishing order. In this sense, the number of troops mattered less than what they were told to do, or not do.
But the most widely circulated criticism of the war is still simply that the U.S. didn't have enough troops. In the most stilted and politicized version of this critique, the administration is said to have ignored the express wishes of its commanders. This line of attack is dependent on the mythology surrounding Army chief of staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. He told a congressional committee prior to the war that it would take "several hundred thousand" troops to pacify Iraq. Critics claim that he was forced out for making this inconvenient estimate. But Shinseki had already been on the outs with Rumsfeld for his resistance to the defense secretary's transformation plans. He retired on schedule, which it had been clear he would do well before his statement about troop levels. Even if the U.S. did need more troops in Iraq, the Shinseki number of several hundred thousand — is that 300,000? more? — was clearly absurd.
Immediately after the war, widespread looting occurred. This is taken as a sign not just that there weren't enough troops, but that there was inadequate post-war planning. "Not preventing the looting was a huge mistake," says former CPA official Michael Rubin (an occasional contributor to NR and National Review Online), "but the problem wasn't a lack of planning on the part of DoD civilians or the State Department." CENTCOM divides a war, from pre-deployment to the post-war, into four phases. There was plenty of planning for Phase 3, the decisive operations of the war, and Phase 4, post-war stability operations. But the transition between the two was fumbled. "We can do all the planning we like," says Rubin, "but someone needs to make the call as to when Phase 3 ends."
CENTCOM basically said that the fall of Baghdad did not bring the end of Phase 3 because there wasn't security yet. Jay Garner, who was charged with leading the post-war as head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), said there wasn't security yet because Phase 4 operations that would reassure and win over the population hadn't started. "This is a very hazy, fog-of-war transition to make," says a senior administration official. "It was clearly a stumbling block." It was an area that could have used Rumsfeld's attention, and that of national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, whose job it is to impose coherence on U.S. national security policy.
At least some policy staff from State and Defense wanted commanders on the ground to guard buildings and shoot the looters, according to one official involved. But commanders were reluctant to put their men at risk for what they thought were just political objectives after they had already won the war. "People below Rumsfeld," says the official, "were saying, 'You have to shoot the looters,' but he didn't want to overrule his commanders."
Tommy Franks and his team didn't give the impression that they were eager to undertake stability operations. "Franks was supposed to plan for what CENTCOM called Phase 4, the period after major combat operations," says an official. "He knows that he has a responsibility for safety and stability in the country. He obviously concluded — I'm inferring — that he would have the resources available to fulfill this mission as the military occupier after major combat operations." But this official adds, "He was a Phase 3 kind of general." Another official says, "One of the unanswered questions is, 'What was Tommy Franks doing?'"
"Did we need more MPs [military police]?" Franks deputy Gen. Mike DeLong asks. "Yes. But we were funneling all our people through Kuwait and we couldn't get the MPs through there fast enough." Just prior to the war, Saddam had emptied the jails. "We were still fighting the war," says DeLong, "with all those criminals loose. We can't get our MPs in fast enough, but we don't want to pull out our front-line troops to guard buildings because they're still fighting Saddam's forces in other parts of the country." They guarded buildings they thought would be targeted, such as the key ministries, but other buildings were left defenseless.
The war ended on May 1. On May 22, the retirement of Tommy Franks was announced, a pretty stark statement of his lack of interest in Phase 4. "I was stunned by that, stunned," says one senior administration official. DeLong explains, "We had been fighting since the [attack on the USS] Cole, three years without a day off. There was a time we had to go. We didn't have any more blood to give."
Even if the commanders had been enthusiastic about Phase 4, stopping the looting wouldn't have been easy. "You couldn't put a soldier on every street corner in a city the size of Los Angeles and expect to stop everything," says an administration official. More important, it was hard psychologically for officials who believed they were liberating a country to turn around and crack down on civilians. "It's like sending troops into Warsaw Square to arrest people for being too unruly in 1989," says a former defense official. A former CPA official says, "There was a real sense of euphoria right after the fall of the statue. You would have stamped out any goodwill right at the start." An administration official explains, "It's very hard to say what would have been the right thing to do, when American forces were told in the lead-up to the war that we didn't want to impose ourselves as occupiers, that they have a police force, that they understand the rule of law, and have a civic infrastructure that will provide for stability."
'OUR INTELLIGENCE WAS VERY LIMITED'
All that proved wrong. Even though everyone knew that the military had to provide for stability and that there was a risk of public disturbances, the breadth and ferocity of the looting came as a shock. "We had no idea people would run into the bathrooms of public buildings and run off with the toilets and the sinks," says one official. "It's not something we contemplated as a possibility. We could not believe that the population would, in a revenge-like manner, strip away all the vestiges of Saddam's government and that government's infrastructure." He adds, "None of the estimates I saw anticipated that kind of looting."
It was a blow to the Iraqis' confidence in the U.S. It led to a conspiracy theory about how we wanted to punish the Iraqis through disorder, and it meant that people were sent home from work because their office equipment had been stolen. "It created a general atmosphere of lawlessness from which we didn't recover," says a former occupation official. Larry Diamond, another former official, argues, "That sent the signal of a lack of control that gave a lot of ideas to the jihadists and insurgents."
Missing the possibility of such widespread looting was just one way in which the intelligence was flawed. "Our intelligence about Iraq was very limited," says a senior administration official. "The intelligence community got a lot of things wrong, not simply the WMD. They did not understand the exact role of Iraqi police. They thought the police would be usable. We had no other basis for knowing that, to the contrary, police were viewed as political and an instrument of oppression." And "that was the basis of ORHA, of the CPA," says another official. "We based the plan on standing up the Iraqi police. It turned out that the corruption went so deep into the ranks that the police were useless. It meant a major recalibration of our plan that is going on to this day. It was an intelligence failure of the first magnitude."
Then there was the state of the infrastructure. One official involved in post-war planning recalls seeing the state of the infrastructure, which the U.S. had gone out of its way to avoid bombing during the war, on his first post-war visit to Iraq: "We were shocked." He explains, "Saddam had skimmed the money off the Oil for Food program and spent it on his palaces and basically nothing else. That was never picked up on. The infrastructure was so dilapidated. It added billions and billions to the reconstruction job."
We were left to start almost from scratch.
Ramzi Haidar/AFP
Combine the rottenness of the infrastructure with the looting, and we were left to start almost from scratch. "When that violence, that looting, petered out," says an official, "we were left with an essential-services infrastructure [water, sewer, electricity] that was archaic to start with and now almost destroyed, and a governmental infrastructure [police, the ministries] that had abandoned its posts." The food-distribution network was so backward and irrational, it was almost incomprehensible. As one official puts it, "It was a process which a First World person from, say, USAID, would look at and say, 'I don't even know how a person would work through these problems.'" This was how Iraqis did things, he notes, "despite being touted as one of the most educated populaces in the Middle East."
That all this went wrong has created the idea that there was no post-war planning, or that all of it was based on a willfully rosy scenario. "We did a lot of thinking about what could go wrong in Iraq," says one official. "The standard line in the fever swamps is, 'We had one source of information in Iraq — Ahmad Chalabi [founder and leader of the main exile group, the Iraqi National Congress]. He told us everything was going to be a cakewalk.' As if we are complete idiots."
'DOZENS AND DOZENS OF BRIEFINGS'
Before the war, Rumsfeld had been willing to look at the worst case. He prepared a memo for the president that listed everything defense officials could think of that might go wrong. "Literally, for two or three pages," says an official familiar with the memo, "with an item per line, he went through all the things that could go wrong with a war in Iraq: mass starvation, large numbers of international refugees, the blowing up of oil facilities, Scud-missile attacks on Israel, the overthrow of governments throughout the region, terrorist attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere, and on and on. He produced maybe 50, 60 of these hair-raising possibilities."
In late summer 2002, the NSC created the Executive Steering Group (ESG), a high-level body tasked with preparing for the post-war. "There were dozens and dozens of briefings, for vetting and approval, regarding the post-war," says an administration official. Interagency planning groups — the Iraq Pol-Mil Planning Cell, the Coalition Working Group, the Humanitarian Reconstruction Group, and the Energy Infrastructure Working Group — fed into the ESG. As did the work of other planners at State, Treasury, Commerce, CIA, OMB, and USAID. The ESG's work, in turn, went up the chain from the deputies to the principals to the president. "It was the standard NSC flow," says an official.
In January 2003, Bush signed NSPD-24, which led to the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, charged with implementing the planning on the ground in Iraq and to be run by Garner. In addition, the military had its own planning group, the so-called JTF-4 that produced a 300-page op-order for Phase 4, the post-war operation.
Bush critics pretend that there was no planning besides that which took place through the State Department's Future of Iraq Project. It is alleged that the Pentagon ignored all the important planning done under this project for ideological and turf reasons. But the sprawling project was uneven, sometimes had an academic air, and didn't create an action plan, certainly not to deal with the dire problems that would face the coalition in Baghdad. The portions of its work that were considered relevant weren't ignored. They were briefed up to the higher levels of the administration, and used.
"Because it was the State Department, the project had a lot to do with justice and human rights," says an official, "not so much with looking at basic services." Bush critics have portrayed it as a panacea, but "it was not the answer to Phase 4. If we had taken the Future of Iraq Project and given it to ORHA and said, 'You can't deviate from this,' we still would have had a lot of the problems we encountered."
Some of the post-war planning turned out just fine — for instance, how to avoid a catastrophic collapse in the Iraqi currency, the dinar. "If we go in there and do it wrong," says one official, "we could destroy the value of billions of dollars of currency." But the planning overall was poorly coordinated. "Everyone thought they were doing all the planning," says one official of the disparate efforts. And a lot of it turned out to be for the wrong thing. The administration was prepared for an epic humanitarian disaster. "We were ready to take in Iraqi displaced persons," says one official, "because we thought that was the most likely scenario." Instead, public disorder was the biggest challenge. "They were prepared for a worst-case scenario on the humanitarian front and not on the political front and the security front," says Larry Diamond.
The level of the security challenge rendered a lot of the planning moot. According to one official, "The planning was so advanced that we were planning for the future bases of U.S. forces, where they would stay during Phase 4. We were laying out training ranges, making sure the soldiers would be able to continue their training while they would be in stability operations and humanitarian and civil-affairs work, helping the Iraqis stand back up their government. But we didn't know we would have to provide as much security as we would have to provide."
'WHAT ARMITAGE DOES FOR A LIVING'
And so, Jay Garner, the retired three-star general heading ORHA, was thrown into an Iraq that had, against expectations, been looted bare, where the police had disappeared, and where infrastructure was decrepit or destroyed. There were still other surprises for Garner. "Another thing that the intelligence community told us was that there would be whole units of the Iraqi armed forces to come over to our side," says an official. "Jay Garner went there with an expectation that we were going to be able to use the Iraqi military for reconstruction."
Garner handled a bad situation badly. Rumsfeld had tapped him because of his work on Operation Provide Comfort, relieving the Kurds after the first Iraq war. But the humanitarian crisis he might have been suited to handle hadn't materialized. Instead he had a huge political and security problem on his hands.
He talked, absurdly, of convening a constitutional convention, writing a constitution, and holding an election all by August. He had a political tin ear, and the U.S. military didn't take him seriously. General DeLong says, "Initially we didn't get a powerful person into Iraq. Garner didn't have the muscle" to officiate between the military services and the State Department. "Here was a retired three-star general in there and not all the other generals thought he was that person" — the powerful person necessary.
Garner had expected to stay for 90 days, but was ushered out more quickly. If he was a failure, he wasn't a Pentagon failure. He surrounded himself with State Department and USAID officials. State not only waged turf battles (as did the Pentagon), but often won them. One official explains, "This is what [Colin Powell deputy Dick] Armitage does for a living: 'I want my guys in Baghdad.' That was out of control, and the DoD was just as guilty of that, but Armitage was winning these fights hand over fist."
'The philosophy Rumsfeld had was . . . to empower the Iraqis.'
William Philpott/Reuters
State Department official Ryan Crocker, head of the Near East bureau, led Garner's political team. "That's the bureau that produced the Future of Iraq Project," says a different official. "There wasn't even an OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] person doing political advice with Garner. If the people who did the Future of Iraq project think that their stuff was not picked up as it should have been, then what they're saying is that it wasn't picked up by the head of their own bureau in the State Department."
Garner was replaced by former ambassador Jerry Bremer, who was more a creature of the White House than the Pentagon, but ended up being something of an independent operator. With his arrival, the U.S. lurched into a full-fledged military occupation of a country in much worse shape than it had imagined. This represented a total defeat of the Pentagon's vision, which had been to avoid, or minimize, a U.S. occupation, by creating an Iraqi provisional government before the invasion or immediately after it. This was one of the many clashes between the State Department and Defense. State had wanted a Baghdad conference six or seven weeks after the occupation of Baghdad. The Department of Defense had wanted to set up an immediate government.
"We wanted to build on the theme of liberation, rather than occupation, and hand over more authority sooner. We would not have had an occupation government. That idea did not prevail. There was a lot of opposition throughout the government," says a defense official.
This would not necessarily have meant installing Ahmad Chalabi in power. The original conception was for a group of seven exiles, with a slot for a governor from each province as it became liberated. This approach was approved by consensus at a conference of the Iraqi opposition in February 2003 at Salahuddin in Iraqi Kurdistan. This meeting would have given the process — had it not been tossed aside — an Iraqi imprimatur. Such a government could have created the same situation as when sovereignty was handed over on June 28, 2004, only much sooner. Instead the compromise forged by the NSC had the U.S. picking a governing council after it was already occupying Iraq and running it according to the international law of occupation, thanks to the first post-war U.N. resolution (the British had insisted on the law-of-occupation language).
"The philosophy Rumsfeld had was that the goal should be from the very beginning to empower the Iraqis," says a former defense official. "If there is a legitimate criticism, it's the CPA being so heavy-handed for as long as it was. It was a violation of Rumsfeld's own principle that Iraq was for the Iraqis." Says another official: "That we would have a Jerry Bremer figure, that got people thinking of an occupation in Iraq. That was the fundamental error."
Bremer planned on a U.S. occupation that would last 18-24 months, much too long in the minds of many Pentagon officials. "We wanted it as short as possible," says one of them. "We eventually got it turned around." In the fall of 2003, Bremer was called back to Washington and the plan that eventually turned sovereignty back over to the Iraqis was adopted.
'THEY TOOK THE URINALS OUT OF THE BARRACKS'
The problem was that Bremer was taking ownership of a failed society, and the occupation would inevitably be tarred with its failures. As the spring of last year turned into the summer, the mood began to sour, with the security situation worsening, with reconstruction therefore slowing, and with the sheer reality of the situation sinking in. A senior administration official explains, "An Iraqi sees that the sewage isn't any better, that there isn't 24/7 electricity and gas isn't available at a quarter a liter, and he says, 'I thought this would turn out differently.' He looks at raw sewage running down the middle of his street and says, 'This hasn't met my expectations.'"
This is by no means to say that Bremer per se was the problem. "The situation was nothing like we expected. There was much more resistance, much more violence, and much less control," says Larry Diamond. "We just weren't prepared." Bremer inherited an impossible situation — he was thrown into Iraq literally ten days after getting the assignment from the White House — and his powerful persona was needed to fill the post-Garner vacuum. "The good thing was," says an official, "you needed an assertion of authority. You needed somebody with a strong hand."
Everyone credits Bremer with great personal bravery, an ability to make tough decisions, and extraordinary organizational skills. His vision of the country's future was dogged and correct: a unified, democratic, and federal post-Saddam Iraq. Two of his biggest decisions have been widely panned, but were probably the right ones, even if they inevitably had drawbacks as well as benefits.
Bremer was taking ownership of a failed society.
Roger L. Wollenberg/UPI
Bremer officially disbanded the Iraqi army, which the conventional wisdom says created disaffection that helped feed the insurgency. But the army had really disbanded itself. It was, in its essence, an instrument of repression. Shia conscripts weren't going to serve another day under the lash of Sunni officers. "They took the urinals out of the barracks," is how one official puts it, "and went home." Michael Rubin breaks it down this way: "The Shia conscripts left; the officers with skills went out and started their own businesses; the corrupt and incompetent officers stayed." The U.S. got a little taste of how trying to maintain Saddam's army would have worked in its April 2004 deal with former Baathist officers in Fallujah, who promised to police the city and promptly faded away or joined the other side.
The other Bremer decision generally considered a mistake is his de-Baathification order. It deprived the country of experienced governing talent, and the order eventually would, probably rightly, be moderated in its implementation. But given the realities of Iraq, something along the lines of Bremer's order was necessary. The future of the new Iraq could not be in the minority Sunnis attached to the benefits of Baathism, but had to be in the majority Shia and in the Kurds. These groups would have been justifiably alarmed at any attempt to reestablish the old order. "The decision was fundamentally correct," says one official. "Eighty percent of the country is Shia and Kurd. If we had looked like we were reconstituting the regime, we would have had a massive explosion in the rest of the country."
Former Bremer aide Dan Senor says of both decisions, on the army and de-Baathification, "The reason that the Shia let their guard down, the reason that the Kurds let their guard down, was that they saw we were taking serious steps to keep the Baathists from reemerging. If we hadn't done that, there may have been severe retribution against the Sunnis. And the Shia and Kurds might not have cooperated with us. Those symbolic steps were very important early on."
There would have been resistance in the Sunni heartland whatever Bremer did, since it appears that fading into the Sunni triangle was the strategy of the Saddamists from the beginning. Here was yet another unanticipated event that upset the administration's plans and expectations. "If there was any mistake we made, we thought that they would surrender, and we were wrong," says an administration official. The enemy had never been defeated, a rather large failing. This was one of the crucial differences between Japan and Germany on one hand and Iraq on the other — Japan and Germany had been crushed by the U.S., and so were ready to be compliant with their occupiers. Iraq never had this psychology of defeat.
'SOMEBODY PANICKED'
The Baathists lived to fight another day, in an insurgency that was yet another surprise. The New York Times recently reported on an intelligence document that allegedly warned of an insurgency. But that warning was in the final sentence of a 38-page report. It was not one of the report's key findings. "As far as I know," says an official familiar with the pre-war information, "I don't recall anyone at State or the CIA talking about this kind of insurgency."
The insurgency prompted yet more calls for more troops. But the insurgency was mainly an intelligence and political problem not susceptible to solution by sheer numbers. "You hear it all the time, but it's true," says a former CPA official. "The generals weren't asking for more troops. I was in plenty of meetings with them, and they weren't asking for more troops."
Initially, the U.S. didn't take the insurgency seriously enough. Then it tried to crush it on its own, failing to appreciate that it had begun to take on a nationalist character (partly fueled by the occupation) and that having Iraqi forces to deal with it was politically essential. The initial efforts to train Iraqi forces were proved inadequate by the Najaf and Fallujah revolts this April. Iraq wasn't originally thought to need a proper army, so the emphasis was on training police to handle street crime. When the insurgency began to intensify, the police were incapable of handling it. Now there is much more intensive training, but the U.S. is behind the curve on a task everyone agrees is fundamental.
Given how long training has taken, it would have made sense to have a head-start prior to the war. Again, this was the Pentagon's idea. It had plans to train up to 10,000 Iraqis out of the country, creating a major asset in the form of people who knew the language and knew the society — who were Iraqis. "Rumsfeld from the very beginning was focused on training Iraqi forces," says a former defense official. But military commanders considered them only a potential nuisance underfoot and resisted. The State Department worried that training Iraqi forces, as a harbinger of the coming conflict, would undermine diplomacy at the U.N., and questioned what would be done with them if there were no war. In the end, the U.S. trained a mere 71 Iraqis.
Iraqi forces were what was needed to deal with nettlesome problems like Fallujah. There had been some sort of major security incident in Fallujah almost every month from the end of 2003 until April 2004, when things came to a head with the murder and mutilation of four U.S. contractors. The story of how the Marines started to take Fallujah, and then stopped, is murky. Even senior administration officials are confused about how things came to pass. "Somebody panicked," says one official, "and it was a mistake."
The Marines were reluctant to go in, but did so on the basis of a plan they had told the civilian leadership wouldn't create massive civilian casualties. When the Marines attacked, reports of such casualties began to filter back to the CPA. These reports created a political firestorm, with Sunnis threatening to withdraw from the political process, which was then focused on creating a new interim government. Bremer called off the assault, which may have been just days from achieving its objective.
The reason for stopping was understandable, but in retrospect it was disastrously shortsighted. It led to an increase in car bombings around the country as the insurgents worked from their safe haven. The terror attacks have eaten away at the credibility of the Iraqi government and the U.S., while radicals have worked to replicate the success of Fallujah elsewhere in the Sunni Triangle. The Fallujah Brigade, charged with policing Fallujah, proved a fiasco. The top U.S. commanders in Iraq, Generals Abizaid and Sanchez, hadn't known the Marines were creating the brigade of former Baathists, and neither had Bremer.
Fallujah is one of Prime Minister Allawi's major challenges to this day. But Allawi himself is a bright spot in the U.S. experience in Iraq. The fact that he was an exile demonstrates that one of the arguments wielded against the Pentagon — "Exiles can never govern Iraq" — was false. A lot of the dispute, of course, had to do with one exile in particular, Chalabi. "The folks that were deemed to be acceptable leaders by the Department of Defense were not deemed to be acceptable by the State Department, and when those folks were brought in [to Iraq] in the middle of April [2003], we found out that they did not have the kind of support that might have been anticipated," says a senior administration official.
Chalabi probably wasn't the man to run Iraq, and if the Pentagon didn't insist on anointing him — as officials now maintain — he was certainly high on their list. He didn't have political support on the ground. "He had no street credibility," says a former CPA official. "If you ask people about him, you would hear one of three things, or maybe all three: 1) He's a crook; 2) he's not one of us; 3) he's a stooge of the U.S." In any case, he lost all support from the U.S. government when he was quoted in the Daily Telegraph saying any erroneous information that members of his group might have given the U.S. about WMD prior to the war was fine, that they were "heroes in error."
Ideally, State and Defense could have compromised around an initial Iraqi government headed by someone other than Chalabi. But the compromise forged by the National Security Council produced Garner, and then Bremer, who ended up running Iraq. Again, that wasn't necessarily Bremer's fault. He couldn't give more authority to the Iraqi Governing Council that was formed after the war because its leadership proved so dysfunctional. It wasn't until the process that selected Allawi to head the interim government that some legitimate and responsible Iraqi politics began to take hold. CPA officials felt it wouldn't have been responsible to hand over the country to someone right after the war, because Iraqis weren't ready. But the alternative — the occupation — was no bargain.
'A MIASMA'
That captures the way the U.S. experience in Iraq has been, in part, a tragedy — a series of choices that could never be entirely right. The initial invasion proved brilliant, confounding the critics who predicted months of heavy fighting and thousands of casualties? Well, at least some of the American lives it saved upfront may have been lost later on, confronting the Baathists who got away. Disbanding the army alienated the Sunnis? Well, keeping it would have likely alienated the Shias, who could have mounted a revolt that would have chased the U.S. from the country. Every decision had its tradeoffs.
But that is not to say that things couldn't have been handled better. Intelligence will never be perfect, and making that the standard is a formula for inaction. But the doctrine of preemption is folly without a first-rate covert service and a CIA that is better and more aggressive than it is today. The U.S. military has to take a more lively interest in post-combat stability operations, if the problems of the first year and a half in Iraq are to be avoided elsewhere. And the U.S. government must cohere in a way Bush's National Security Council has often failed to make it cohere in Iraq. "It has been a mess out of which no coherent policy has been made," says a distressed official. "It has been a miasma that no one has been in charge of. You can either say that the president wasn't in control, or you can say that the number-two person wasn't in control, and that's Condi."
For all that, the administration still hasn't lost Iraq, and, if it stays the course, it may well prevail. That it has not lost is testament to the skill and courage of the American soldier and to the Iraqis' desire — despite everything — to create something better. In this way, President Bush's vision for the country has been vindicated. Prime Minister Allawi has exercised responsible leadership, not only abiding, but working closely with the Americans. "The most powerful force getting us closer to a policy has been Allawi," says a U.S. official. The major religious figure in the country, Ayatollah Sistani, has been determined in favor of a democratic Iraq, and the performance of properly trained Iraqi forces, in places like Najaf and Samarra, has provided encouraging signs that they may yet be ready to step up to the plate.
Allawi is a bright spot in the U.S. experience in Iraq.
Michael Kleinfeld/UPI
There is no taking away the accomplishment of toppling Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration has been resolute in the face of all the difficulties, including, yes, its own missteps. If Iraq yet proves a success — creating a decent government in that strategically central country — the mistakes of the war's aftermath will be seen as speed bumps, inevitable mistakes and readjustments inherent in any grand enterprise.
Bush's critics, meanwhile, have had the luxury of irresponsibility that comes with being out of office, and have taken full advantage of it. They have indulged paranoid fantasies about the administration's "neocons," failed to offer constructive criticism, waged demagogic attacks based on Halliburton and all manner of other nonsense, fudged their answer to the all-important question of whether they would have invaded, and pounced on every hint of realistic analysis out of the administration (e.g., Rumsfeld's recent obvious statement that the Iraqi elections might not be perfect). Nothing in their performance during the Iraq episode marks them as deserving of power.
That Bush is the best thing going on national security makes it all the more imperative that he get better. "Every indication I have is that Bush is extremely unhappy with how this has gone for obvious reasons," says one official. "I think there is going to be vigorous retooling in a second term." He should get at it as soon as possible, assuming he has the opportunity. There's a war to be won, after all. |
| | | 1 | biliruben
ID: 441182916
Wed, Oct 20, 2004, 17:34
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What a rediculous monkey show. Every single aspect of post-war Iraq was incorrectly predicted, often wildly in the opposite direction of the truth on the ground. What a bunch of complete incompetents.
Before we attacked, I predicted that the conquest would be easy, the occupation would be hard. I requested post-war scenarios, but was rebuffed with mild assurances, the need for flexibility and talk of the need to keep intelligence classified. What a joke.
Pie-in-the-sky optimism as the basis for long-term post-war planning. This is a bigger indictment of Bush, the war, and nation-building as a legitimate foriegn policy goal than the left could ever bring. Even if we had strong, coordinated leadership on the ground post-conquest, this exercise was doomed to failure, and only hundreds of billions and tens of thousands of lives of the next 5 plus years offers any hope of redemption. That should have been obvious from the beginning.
Thanks for the article, Madman.
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| | | 2 | Tree
ID: 76471215
Wed, Oct 20, 2004, 17:37
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to me, the biggest issue was incorrectly predicting how we would be treated in Iraq - the Bush regime said we'd be greeted with hugs and flowers, and those on the left opposed to war believe we might be greeted with hand grenades and guerilla warfare.
as someone who knows the way many radical muslims and arabs fight from pretty up close, i know that's how i believed.
i wonder if Bush's people had even the smallest clue of what reality truly was, if we would have attacked at all.
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| | | 3 | sarge33rd
ID: 599381710
Wed, Oct 20, 2004, 17:56
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i wonder if Bush's people had even the smallest clue of what reality truly was, if we would have attacked at all.
Of course he would have invaded Iraq anyway. Been quite some time, but not long after GWB declared "mission accomplished", there were those in the halls of power who let it leak that the Iraq invasion was an intent since the inauguration. GWBII was going to invade Iraq, whether Saddam complied or not, whether W'sMD existed or not. He needed to find an excuse though, and that was provided on 9/11.
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| | | 4 | prefek
ID: 59321116
Wed, Oct 20, 2004, 19:00
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Good info, Madman.
While we certainly need to look at the mistakes made in the conduction of the war, my main critique is the war itself. What went wrong with Iraq, as far as I'm concerned, is Iraq itself. I included some of my complaints in the "Thoughtful commentaries" thread.
As sarge said, the intent to invade Iraq was in this administration virtually from day 1. This is echoed by insiders in the administration, most notably Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar in the administration. Even now there are reports of atomic energy agencies in the US that knew from the onset the scant evidence of WMDs that we found, such as aluminum tubes, was meaningless- those tubes couldn't have been used for weapons. The administration repeated allegations of nuclear deals that had all the credibility of a "rumor on the internets."
Further, the fact that the administration was more aware of Iraq's status as a non-threat, is evident in some of the actions described by the article you posted. Despite not being fully prepared to wage the war, it was literally within hours that our soldiers were stationed on defense guarding the oil fields- well before any force was sent to inspect "WMD laboratories" or "suspected" WMD stockpiles. These are not the action of a force concerned about WMDs.
If I have time, I might include a couple sociological points in here that I think add to the failings of the actual execution of the war, but it's the war itself that I have a problem with.
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| | | 5 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 12:37
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In the Spreading Democracy and Ending Tyranny thread, Baldwin take considerable exception to my following statement:
...at this point, if you really don't know how those of us who are unhappy with the war would rather have seen much of it done, you haven't been paying attention.
Baldwin responds first by dually mocking me and questioning my moral standing:
We really wouldn't have been paying attention if we were so gullible as to think your type was interested in the fate of the Iraqis or had an option for helping them that you actually approved of.
And then he follows up with a more tangible but equally deluded post:
Please direct me to the left thread where the prefered action hasn't always been 'Cut and Run'.
I'm really intrigued by that line 'those of us who are unhappy with the war would rather have seen much of it done'. I am sure you would be proud to explain that plan that you've been pushing from the beginning. Whatever it was escapes me.
I pointed out to him that I have never supported leaving Iraq in its current state. And I still don't. But since this is a tangent that distracts from that thread about the President's Inaugural Address, I'll try to continue the discussion here, despite Baldwin's conflicting positions of posing questions to me while also maintaining that I am not worthy of being paid any attention to.
I think this is a very reasonable place for this discussion, as I have seen very little conservative response to the following issues, except to dismiss them as self-loathing negativity from liberal haters. Anyway...
What would I like to have seen done differently?
1) The White House and Pentagon should have been more honest with the American people from the onset. They fully knew that Iraq was not the immediate or present threat to America at home that they were describing in their rhetoric at the time in Nov/Dec/Jan/Feb 2002-3.
2) The White House should have been more discerning with regard to the evidence they accepted as conclusive proof of illegal Iraqi WMDs. Hindsight is 20/20 of course and I fully admit that at the time I was not questioning this evidence, still this is a fair issue to raise today.
3) The White House should have shown itself to be more eager to hold accountable those responsible for our intelligence failures.
4) There was no reason to rush into Iraq when we did. The military buildup around Iraq would have served well to contain Saddam and we could have continued our focus on finding Osamma in Afghanistan at that crucial point in time. It stands to reason that such a show of restraint on our part coupled with moer stalling and posturing tactics from Saddam might have translated into greater cooperation from other nations. If anyone is curious, I did support the invasion of Iraq at the time, tho my opinion was that we should have waited a few months. I still believe that if we had taken that approach at the time, many, many lives could possibly have been spared.
Certainly, the situation wouldn't likely be any worse today.
5) The CPA should have given the work of rebuilding Iraq to the many capable and eager Iraqis who need jobs to feed their families.
6) Tell us who at the CPA and or American run Iraqi Ministry was held accountable for the missing $8.8 billion. Tell us what happened to that money.
7) I don't see why it was necessary to allow foreign investors free access to Iraqi markets without any built in motivations for consumers to prefer local businesses.
8) CPA should have assumed control of Iraq's former government enterprizes and then handed control back to the interim government. Instead, practically everything was privatized. Who's holding the keys that make Iraq work now?
9) Foreign contractors and their security squads should not be given full immunity from Iraqi law.
10) Tarriffs should not have been lifted on all imports and exports.
11) I will never support the US' contorting the restrictions of torturing prisoners so as to allow for the greatest leeway possible in this area. The condoned use of torture tactics there and in Guantanamo will be the great scandal of this administration.
12) White House must cease their refusal to concede any specific mistakes and miscalculations in this evdeavor.
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| | | 6 | Baldwin
ID: 500121617
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 12:56
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Any other liberals here want to be included in the 'I never advocated Cut-and-Run category?
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| | | 7 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:09
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That post serves two purposes. First to answer some questions directed at me in the Inaugural Address thread and second to challenge conservatives to comment on my issues with how the administration has mishandeled the Iraq situation.
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| | | 8 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:23
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Any other liberals here want to be included in the 'I never advocated Cut-and-Run category?
I advocated "cut and run" because I felt our coalition partners Mongolia and El Salvador could take over.
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| | | 9 | Baldwin
ID: 500121617
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:25
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Since I from the beginning had no idea how to do what Bush has achieved so far with so few troops and so few casualties, it's really hard for me to pick out what errors have been made that should have been foreseeable and avoidable.
I'm so disgusted by the unrelieved negativity of Bush's critics that I don't know if I can muster that much energy.
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| | | 10 | Seward Norse
ID: 587262710
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:32
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As a lurker, I'd have to say that both sides arguments would be more powerful if EVERYTHING Bush did was not either always right or always wrong. There has to be some things he does wrong. There also has to be some things he does right.
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| | | 11 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:38
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what Bush has achieved so far with so few troops and so few casualties
Let's see,
The world's most high-tech jets dropping the world's most high-tech bombs vs RPGs and Russian rifles.
How tough is that to figure out.
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| | | 12 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:42
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I'm so disgusted by the unrelieved negativity of Bush's critics that I don't know if I can muster that much energy.
Right but you would never be so negative. You'll just occasionaly point out that he comes from a Nazi supporting lineage and tell us how he intends to get America so overextended that it has no choice but to turn the duties over to a global body.
13) We should have ensured a government structure that will allow for greater local representation from Iraq's varied ethnic/religious/geographical groups.
Anyway, Baldwin, perhaps you could just address my issues #5 - #13. I'm not overly negative at all here. I was asked what I would like to see differently, here it is as plain as I could say it.
Well if it helps any, Seward, I'll point out here that I was in favor of Res 1441 and, subsequently, the invasion of Iraq during the drumbeat and buildup, based on my being convinced that Iraq was in violation of 1441. Also, if you'll notice in my post I did not include any criticisms of the waging of the invasion, itself. There are certainly some things that Bush has done that he deserves to be commended for. For example, there were few or no dissenters here from the war in Afghanistan. But I was asked what I think was done wrong.
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| | | 13 | biliruben
ID: 500432513
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 13:48
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RE: 6. Absumudafukinlootly.
Go back to threads even before the war, even though I was against going in at all, and I predicted it would take 5-10 years of occupation, and have advocated sticking it out longer than most conservatives are willing to.
You break it, you buy it.
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| | | 14 | Baldwin
ID: 500121617
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 14:21
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5) I have no way of estimating whether Iraqi companies were capable of rebuilding that country in the timeframe that it was needed. Did they have the available resources of all of America's major multinational engineering firms? Our was it purely Bush cronyism and Iraq could have managed just fine? I don't know the answer. I do know that rebuilding the infrastructure before we alienated every last Iraqi was not optional.
6) You tell me. Whose fault was it? I don't know. You yourself say no one knows. America's power elite ripped off America in the S&L scandal far worse than that so I wouldn't put it past them but I don't know anything about this one.
7} Yeah, I suspect some lobbyists and campaign contributers are getting away with murder economically speaking here.
8) My kneejerk reaction is I'm all for privatization however I smell a rat. It sounds like the same sort of mafia privatization/confiscation we saw when Russia went 'free market'. I'll back investigation of these details to the hilt but you'll prolly get little media cooperation.
9) I suspect this was neccessary. This function was/is hanging by a thread and I don't think we need to hang a noose around these brave guys risking decapitation every day.
10) Of course they should have been lifted. Think of the starving children. If liberals were crying for the lifting of trade restrictions for Saddam, why not for Iraq now?
11) My views on this are well stated and poorly understood for some reason I can't figure out.
12) Bush shouldn't admit to one mistake as long as his detractors insist he be as flawless as God. No battle plan survives first contact but his detractors claim he should have foreseen every last problem or his handling is inexcusable.
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| | | 15 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 14:30
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10) Of course they should have been lifted. Think of the starving children. If liberals were crying for the lifting of trade restrictions for Saddam, why not for Iraq now?
Don't get cute. Trade tarriffs are hardly the same thing as sanctions.
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| | | 16 | Baldwin
ID: 500121617
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 14:40
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Normally the left is all for debt forgiveness and any other thing they can think of to give the third world a leg up. You are going to go all trade protectionist against the Iraqis at this time? I don't get it.
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| | | 17 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 570452618
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 20:19
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RE: 6 I'll second that absumudafukinlootly by bili.
While I too, was against the idea of "picking a fight with Iraq", not once since the debacle has started have I advocated closing up shop. Quite the opposite - we need a stronger presence - and not just us; we need to go on bended knee to the rest of the world and admit that while we were wrong for going, we can't finish the job alone, and since it's in the interest of the rest of the planet could we get a little help over here?
Of course that will never happen, and what's more, noone in the highest levels of this fraud will ever be held accountable.
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| | | 18 | sarge33rd
ID: 440332322
Wed, Jan 26, 2005, 22:33
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I dont recall saying to just abandon the place either. Not after we went in. To leave now, would be to have created the most cluster-fvcked scenario one could imagine. Like sox however, I think we need to crawl, beg, plead whatever it takes, to get some world participation in this process. Something GWB just is not gonna do though. It would mean admitting he was wrong in the first place, and he is NOT about to do that.
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| | | 19 | nerveclinic
ID: 34757310
Thu, Jan 27, 2005, 03:44
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Any other liberals here want to be included in the 'I never advocated Cut-and-Run category?
I prefer just staying in the "no invasion of the soverign nation of Iraq" in the first place catagory thanks.
I also would be in the no invasion of Viet Nam Catagory.
No Invasion of Panama.
No Installation of Hussien in the first place catagory.
No propping up Pinochet.
No training the Death squad military of El Salvador
No trading guns for drugs with the Contras...
You stick with the guy you think blew up the OKL. Fed Building though Badlwin.
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| | | 20 | nerveclinic
ID: 34757310
Thu, Jan 27, 2005, 03:46
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it's really hard for me to pick out what errors have been made that should have been foreseeable and avoidable.
How about the leveling of fallujah?
But then killing iraq women and children just can't be avoided?
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| | | 21 | Boldwin
ID: 1411237
Sat, Feb 26, 2005, 05:11
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This was unavoidable, still it's amazingly well organized, widespread and under-reported.
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| | | 22 | sarge33rd
ID: 35132922
Sat, Feb 26, 2005, 08:17
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substitute N. Ireland, Catholic and Protestant for Iraq, Shiite and Baathist.....and none of this is new at all. Why is anybody in the least bit surprised, by what is happening over there?
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| | | 23 | Boldwin
ID: 241292815
Fri, Mar 11, 2005, 14:17
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The question of the day seems to be just when should one jump on the liberal tumbrel...er bandwagon. Move over Daniel Schorr...
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| | | 24 | Baldwin
ID: 241292815
Sat, Mar 19, 2005, 02:39
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Washington Post - Will the Mideast Bloom?
By Youssef M. Ibrahim
Sunday, March 13, 2005; Page B01
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates
Listen to the conversations in the cafes on the edge of the creek that runs through this Persian Gulf city, and it is hard to believe that the George W. Bush being praised by Arab diners is the same George W. Bush who has been widely excoriated in these parts ever since he took office.
Yet the balmy breeze blowing along the creek carries murmurs of approval for the devoutly Christian U.S. president, whose persistent calls for democracy in the Middle East are looking less like preaching and more like timely encouragement.
Nowadays, intellectuals, businessmen and working-class people alike can be caught lauding Bush's hard-edged posture on democracy and cheering his handling of Arab rulers who are U.S. allies. Many also admire Bush's unvarnished threats against Syria should it fail to pull its soldiers and spies out of Lebanon before the elections there next month -- a warning the United Nations reinforced last week with immediate effects. For Bush, it is not quite a lovefest but a celebration nonetheless.
"His talk about democracy is good," an Egyptian-born woman was telling companions at the Fatafeet (or "Crumbs") restaurant the other night, exuberant enough for her voice to carry to neighboring tables. "He keeps hitting this nail. That's good, by God, isn't it?" At another table, a Lebanese man was waxing enthusiastic over Bush's blunt and irreverent manner toward Arab autocrats. "It is good to light a fire under their feet," he said.
From Casablanca to Kuwait City, the writings of newspaper columnists and the chatter of pundits on Arabic language satellite television suggest a change in climate for advocates of human rights, constitutional reforms, business transparency, women's rights and limits on power. And while developments differ vastly from country to country, their common feature is a lifting -- albeit a tentative one -- of the fear that has for decades constricted the Arab mind.
Regardless of Bush's intentions -- which many Arabs and Muslims still view with suspicion -- the U.S. president and his neoconservative crowd are helping to spawn a spirit of reform and a new vigor to confront dynastic dictatorships and other assorted ills. It's enough for someone like me, who has felt that Bush's attitude toward the Mideast has been all wrong, to wonder whether his idea of setting the Muslim house in order is right.
And yet, it is too early for congratulations. Bush may feel inspired by the example of President Ronald Reagan, who told Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" in Berlin, but the Middle East may more closely resemble 1989 Beijing than 1989 Berlin. While communism collapsed largely of its own weight in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union without U.S. intervention, pro-democracy demonstrators in China were squashed. What will U.S. policy in the Middle East look like if the autocrats, princes and religious fundamentalists make a stand against the voices of freedom?
That said, there have been many reasons in the past two months for Arab democrats to feel giddy.
On Jan. 9, Palestinians cast ballots in free elections where the winner did not, unlike candidates in "elections" so often held elsewhere in the region, get 99 percent of the vote. And within the late Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, younger members are calling for primaries to choose fresh candidates before July's legislative elections.
Then at the end of January, 8 million Iraqis marched to the polls, despite threats of violence, to vote for a new parliament. Since then, the winners have been negotiating and balancing legislative blocks in ways that have defied predictions of Shiite domination and which, despite continued bombings and Sunni discontent, could yet be a model of the multiparty political process.
On Feb. 10, in the veiled Saudi kingdom, royal princes let in a crack of light with the first municipal elections in 42 years. Instead of being welcomed as a step forward, the elections were sarcastically derided on Saudi Internet chat sites as Mickey Mouse exercises in which half the people -- women -- couldn't vote, and half the winners were appointed by government. In the past, this sort of brazen truth-telling wouldn't have taken place, and it shows that sham or limited elections won't satisfy people.
Above all there has been the outburst in the streets of Beirut following the Feb. 14 assassination of Lebanese leader Rafiq Hariri. The murder was, to use the phrase that Napoleon's foreign minister Talleyrand is often credited with coining, "worse than a crime; it was a blunder." It laid bare all the resentment of Syria's 30-year occupation, meddling and hit squads. The demonstrations against Syria, and even the massive counter-demonstrations last week by Hezbollah, have framed a broad and (so far) nonviolent debate on the future shape of the entire Arab world.
In the largest Arab country, Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak grudgingly announced on Feb. 26 that the constitution would be altered to allow other candidates to run for the presidency. While everyone expects Mubarak, who has ruled for 24 years, to win yet another six-year term in elections this fall at the age of 77, the Sphinx had blinked. More evidence of Bush's pressure.
The groundswell continues to spread. A few days ago, Kuwaiti women hit the streets to demand the right to vote, challenging bearded Islamist parliamentarians over what the Koran says, or does not say, about the rights of women. They won the government's support for a new proposal to parliament. The Saudis then rushed to say they would allow women to vote in the next municipal elections. It matters little whether they mean it, Saudi women heard it.
This much is real. And while many Arab democrats have been struggling for years, there is a keen sense of irony that a passionately Christian American president who has supported Israel, invaded an Arab country and presided over an occupation marred by violence might actually make a positive difference in the Muslim world. It has people here citing the Koranic verse that speaks of a catastrophe that bears good fruits.
The din of democracy talk has been amplified by satellite television, the Internet and cell phones, and that is a new wrinkle for autocratic regimes experienced at quiet repression.
Al-Jazeera, whose audience numbers in the tens of millions, gave blanket coverage of the Lebanese protests, including live interviews from Beirut's Martyrs' Square as well as debates, analysis and talk shows. CNN and BBC broadcasts seen here have also tracked the events hour by hour.
As the Beirut anti-Syria demonstrations attracted the young and the hip, their images appealed to their well-to-do, educated but usually detached peers throughout the region, triggering new interest in politics. Other governments must sense popular opinion moving because none, except Iran, has rallied to Syria's side.
The intensity of it all has drowned out, at least for now, the usual noise about alleged Israeli conspiracies, neoconservative plots and America's misadventures in Iraq.
Instead, more people are baring their souls, with little apparent fear. On Tuesday an all-women's program on al-Jazeera featured a verbal wrestling match between a veiled advocate of multiple marriages and male supremacy in Islam and several other women who swatted down her views. Even the infamous religious authority Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi of Qatar -- whose edicts range from legitimizing wife beating to the killing of foreigners in Iraq to the shunning of Christians and Jews -- has been remarkably demure on his TV show.
The slogan for this nascent people's revolt has become "Kifaya," which means "enough." It's a word that is both emphatic and vague enough to be all-encompassing yet effective: enough of autocrats, enough corruption, enough occupation, enough repression. It has acquired magical and perhaps lasting power.
A respected Egyptian analyst of the Arab condition, Abdel Moneim Said , argued in the Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq al-Awsat last Wednesday that the "Enough" movement can already claim an important achievement -- sweeping aside the tired argument that "special circumstances" preclude Arabs and Muslims from sharing universal democratic principles.
Another notable voice, Egypt's guru of Arab nationalism, author and writer Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, has pronounced 2005 "the year of the big scare" where old assumptions crumble in the face of demands for reform.
A cartoon that appeared March 3 in a Jordanian newspaper, al-Ghad, captured the sense that the age of autocracy may be drawing to a close. Political cartoonist Emad Hajjaj drew four statues on pedestals. The one furthest to the right, Saddam Hussein, is cracking at the knees and toppling into an almost identical statue of Syrian leader Bashir Assad, which is teetering into a statue of Mubarak, who is falling into a statue whose face can't be seen.
Bush, in his inaugural address, proclaimed America's commitment to spreading democracy. "All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: The United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors," he said. "When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you."
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Not a single Arab ruler is a willing participant in democratic reform. Their regimes are festooned with opportunists attached to their financial and political privileges. And while the Arab media have changed, these regimes still possess the same coercive instruments that have proven effective means of control in the past.
Just as important, many of the potential forces for change are wary of going along with Western-inspired momentum. And violent extremists threaten progress made in Iraq and within the Palestinian Authority.
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Given the uncertainties about U.S. policy, perhaps the most pertinent question is whether the resolve of Arab reformers will prove durable and effective even without substantive U.S. support.
So one is left to wonder if this moment will last more than a moment, whether it will turn into a repeat of the tearing down of the Berlin Wall or whether it will be a reprise of the truncated Beijing Spring. The region lacks China's economic dynamism, but it also lacks a Gorbachev and his policy of perestroika.
For now, all the Middle East has are demonstrators and brave voters who, ballot by imperfect ballot, e-mail by e-mail are burying a culture of fear. And for the moment, that may be enough. I don't know which I find funnier...the ironic humor in the title of this thread or Sarge's favorite bumpersticker - Yeeha is not a foreign policy
Why is it that anyone who gets anything positive accomplished is derided as a cowboy? Sooner or later the public is going to catch on and start insisting on it.
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| | | 25 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 5246912
Sat, Mar 19, 2005, 13:33
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Does anyone else find it ironic that baldwin is extolling the virtues of people praising Bush in the ME who are of the same castes here that are routinely excorciated as intellectuals, liberals, and ivory tower types?
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| | | 26 | sarge33rd
ID: 322471717
Sat, Mar 19, 2005, 13:45
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simle explanation sox; this time...they agree with hm. Therefore, they are currently enlightened. Soon as they disagree with him, they'll become self-loathing America-hating liberals again. :)
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| | | 27 | Baldwin
ID: 241292815
Sat, Mar 19, 2005, 17:38
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In the marketplace of ideas, who cares where the good produce is coming from? Just bring me some top notch ideas.
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| | | 28 | nerveclinic
ID: 92471221
Sun, Mar 20, 2005, 11:21
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Well what's funny about post 24 is that the intention when going into Iraq was never to bring about democracy, in fact it was never mentioned in the same breath as the invasion.
It was always about WMD but once they weren't found Bush had to come up with a new reason to stay there other then oil and construction contracts.
Have a read of Pancho's "Peak Oil" thread and you'll understand the real reason we are there. The "Democracy" issue is the "excuse" for staying there and may likely be the "excuse", or one of the excuses anyway for the next invasion of the next country.
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| | | 29 | sarge33rd
ID: 582341722
Sun, Mar 20, 2005, 11:57
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we already used the "stability of oil supply" excuse back in 1990-1991. This time we had to fabricate the reason. Next time, we wont even bother with that. Ole shrubbery will send condi down to the UN and the conversation will go something like this;
"We're invading Iran in ohhhhhhhhhhh about..." *glances at watch* "3 minutes ago. Any questions?"
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| | | 30 | Baldwin
ID: 241292815
Sun, Mar 20, 2005, 13:02
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the intention when going into Iraq was never to bring about democracy, in fact it was never mentioned in the same breath as the invasion.
It was always about WMD but once they weren't found Bush had to come up with a new reason - Nerve
Now Nerve...Nerve, you know better than that. You know for a fact the neocons went in fully intending to change the face of the middle east and they had been planning to for a decade. Further you believe as do I that Bush is just playing out a NWO stageplay, so no, Bush was not doing it simply over WMD and you know it deeply.
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| | | 31 | nerveclinic
ID: 92471221
Sun, Mar 20, 2005, 14:22
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You got me Baldwin.
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| | | 32 | Baldwin
ID: 241292815
Sun, Mar 20, 2005, 14:44
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Heh, you and I make quite the double-headed monster in ironic shadow of the enemy. What a curious pair we make. No one else hits me in the achilles remotely as often either. 8]
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| | | 33 | Tree
ID: 76471215
Wed, Mar 30, 2005, 15:29
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Expert: Malnutrition Affects Iraq Kids
so, for all your crying about Terri Schiavo, how about these kids?
topple a despot, starve the children...
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| | | 34 | Myboyjack
Dude
ID: 014826271
Thu, Mar 31, 2005, 10:08
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topple a despot, starve the children...
What a load of bunk.
According to UNICEF 25% of Iraqi children were malnourished under Saddam. The goof in tree's link says that the malnourished rate has doubled to 8%. Houston, I think we have a problem.
Don't let the facts get in the way of opposing th overthrow of a dictator though. People might start thinking that democracy was good for them.
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| | | 35 | Myboyjack
Dude
ID: 014826271
Thu, Mar 31, 2005, 10:10
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From tree's link:
The authors of the report in the British-based medical journal The Lancet — researchers from Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University and the Al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad — conceded their data were of "limited precision."
Gee. Ya think?
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| | | 37 | Boldwin
ID: 8347115
Mon, Apr 18, 2005, 17:49
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Let me WARN you that the preceding, while not gory per se, is way deadly graphic.
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| | | 38 | biliruben
Leader
ID: 589301110
Mon, Apr 18, 2005, 18:00
|
It would be nice if you gave a heads-up that you were linking directly to videos.
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| | | 39 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 11:32
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Reconstruction Nightmares Continue
Kellogg Brown & Root is the largest US military contractor in Iraq, and the State Department’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) said KBR has performed so poorly in its work repairing the country’s southern oil pipelines that US officials at one point threatened to terminate the company’s arrangement and have begun working with another contracting firm to finish uncompleted work, a recent State Department report to Congress reveals.
As part of an economic privatization strategy, the Coalition Provisional Authority also refused to award contracts to state-owned companies in Iraq, which in many cases were most qualified to do local reconstruction work, according to a report released last summer by the Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), a US-based human rights group.
Thus, Iraqi businesses and technicians - including many who helped rebuild the country’s electrical system in less than a year after the 1991 Gulf War, only to see it deteriorate under sanctions before Coalition air strikes finished the job during the 2003 invasion -- were effectively barred from participating substantively in the reconstruction of their own country’s infrastructure. This has, in turn, exacerbated unemployment and fueled resentment among many Iraqis against US officials and Western contractors.
Long before the State Department acknowledged the failure of US contracting procedures, EPIC suggested that hiring expensive US firms to do jobs that locals were prepared for was not only dangerous but economically inefficient. "Qualified Iraqi water-system engineers familiar with their own infrastructure sit idle," EPIC observed, "while Bechtel engineers struggle to repair the water systems."
Halabja - No More Saddam Gas Attacks, But No Clean Water
The Halabja project, worth around $10 million, accounted for a small fraction of the $18.4 billion that Congress approved in 2003 for the reconstruction of Iraq, including $4 billion for water and sewage projects. But with the outbreak of insurgency in central and southern Iraq last year, the United States shifted $3.4 billion from water, electricity and oil projects to pay for training and equipping the Iraqi Army and police forces.
The implications of that shift are only now becoming clear as individual projects are canceled in scores of communities across the country. Some of the largest cuts have come in waterworks: of 81 water projects that were to be financed through the Public Works Ministry, all but 13 have been canceled, with many of the rest reduced in scale, ministry officials say.
..and, then there is Fallujah
More than half of Fallujah's 39,000 homes were damaged, and about 10,000 of those were destroyed or left structurally unsound to live in, U.S. officials say. Limited food and fuel supplies mean higher prices and lines that can reach 100 cars at government gas stations.
More than half of Fallujah has no electricity, which is needed to pump water. The bombing caused hundreds of leaks in the city water system and about 60 percent of households must rely on water stored in tanks.
Since these stories come from what some would term the liberal media and probably not true, I attempted to find corroboration from right-leaning sources. Nothing at WorldNetDaily, National Review, Little Green Footballs or The Heritage Foundation.
I did find this paragraph deep into a FoxNews story from last week.
Rice's top deputy, Robert Zoellick, made a surprise visit Wednesday to meet with Iraq's new leaders and inspect reconstruction efforts in Fallujah, a former insurgent stronghold.
Pretty in-depth report.
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| | | 40 | Boldwin
ID: 8347115
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 12:10
|
Did you all see the NYT coverage a while back of Laura Bush's visit to Afghanistan to inspect the progress women are making there? Page 17 if memory serves. I wonder where they'd put Hillary if she went to a UN women's conference? Oh, yeah, the '95 UN conference in Beijing where she happened to be keynote speaker made their headlines.
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| | | 41 | Perm Dude
ID: 17321143
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 12:14
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You should really see someone about that Clinton tic of yours, B.
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| | | 42 | sarge33rd
ID: 153521410
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 12:23
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so, you feel slighted because the Pres Dau didnt get the same coverage as the former First Lady/sitting Senator?
awwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww poor baby
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| | | 43 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 12:38
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Did you all see the NYT coverage a while back of Laura Bush's visit to Afghanistan to inspect the progress women are making there?
Laura Bush's Afghanistan inspection
She was to arrive in Kabul at midday Wednesday and spend about five hours on the ground, spending most of her time being briefed on educational initiatives for Afghan women. She also will meet with President Hamid Karzai and have dinner with U.S. forces at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul.
Wow! Five whole hours on the ground. Minus the hour for dinner with the troops, that makes for a 4 hour investigation. Sounds like a page 17 story to me.
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| | | 44 | J-Bar
ID: 103291910
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 12:46
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PV- I go here to get information on specific projects in Iraq.
iraq reconstruction
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| | | 45 | Boldwin
ID: 8347115
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:01
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PV, if you honestly believe Hillary would have gotten page 17 in the NYT for the exact same trip as [the president's wife - you bozo, Sarge] Laura got, you are crazy.
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| | | 46 | sarge33rd
ID: 153521410
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:11
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well, excuse me sir boldwin. I obviously dont follow the shrub family tree with unwavering attention.
still, PV's pt is spot-on. a 5 hr 'inspection' with an hour in the mess, is hardly pg 1 or headline material.
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| | | 47 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:21
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J-Bar, You go to the government's web site to find out about specific projects in Iraq? Their last entry is on 2/28.
There is no mention of monies planned for reconstruction being diverted to security. There is no mention of the Halabja project being mothballed. There is no mention of KBR's incompetence as related to Congress by the State Department. There is no mention of half of Fallujah being without electricity.
That's like going to the Arizona Cardinals website for information on how they're going to win the Super Bowl this year.
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| | | 48 | J-Bar
ID: 103291910
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:21
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Here is a planned trip by then FL HC, maybe somebody can look up where it was in the NYT.
planned trip by Hillary
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| | | 49 | Motley Crue
Dude
ID: 439372011
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:31
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PV, I take issue with that last statement. I think it's probably more akin to going to the New York Giants site...
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| | | 50 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 13:51
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J-Bar,
from my link in #43
Her trip was kept secret until just before she left from Andrews Air Force Base near Washington.
So it wasn't a planned trip that the media was aware of.
Really, though, all this is just a distraction from the thread title. Laura Bush's Afghani trip is to be commended, but what does it have to do with what the Right's done wrong in Iraq?
Despite the warm and fuzzy claims(really more of a wish list) found on the USAID website, reconstruction efforts in Iraq have been and continue to be plagued with numerous problems, mostly related to foreign contractors' being given jobs that local contractors were fully capable of doing, and huge diversions of reconstruction funds to security issues, which is partly a result of US disbanding the Iraqi Army.
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| | | 51 | J-Bar
ID: 103291910
Tue, Apr 19, 2005, 15:42
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weekly update 04-14-2005
Please read. Not sure if you browsed the whole site but these weekly updates gives specifics to mw of electricity, gallons of water, names,places and costs of differing projects, and even contractor lists.
You may feel that if it is from a government site it can't be trusted but the synopsis from a journalist as to what is wrong seems alot less reliable than the specifics.
Was just giving a trip to compare coverage. If HC planning got as much or coverage than the actual trip of LB or not. Agreed not the right thread.
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| | | 52 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Sat, May 07, 2005, 19:45
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With so many things going wrong lately...*cough*...*giggle*...there was the capture of al qeada #3 Abu Farj al-Libbi.
What's been bugging me for days, and I just hate it when I can't figure something out [which explains the tenaciousness], is the way the guys eyes looked, or more specifically the region below.
The answer I believe is that they smoked him out of a locked room with tear gas and those are burns.
Now the next two things I don't get is why we learn about these things before anyone has time to question him and roll up his network.
Also there is enuff detail in that story to get a whole family of Paks killed in retaliation for how helpful they were. Don't reporters give a fig who they get killed, Mr Polk?
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| | | 53 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Sat, May 07, 2005, 22:24
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What's been bugging me for days, and I just hate it when I can't figure something out
That's exactly how I felt a couple weeks ago about this excerpt from the Kurdistan Observer.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party, on Friday to ask him to finish forming a government as soon as possible, two State Department officials said Monday.
I was going to comment on this story when it first appeared on April 24th, but decided I'd wait until I saw some comments that might enlighten me as to why Rice would be calling Barzani, the Kurd from the DKP who is president of the regional parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan, instead of Jalabani, the Kurd who is the president of Iraq, about expediting the formation of the national government. But there has been no follow-up in either the Western media, the Kurdish media, or the Arab media. No follow-up anywhere.
So one can only speculate. For those who missed it, the day after the Iarqi elections,
Kurdish leaders in the central government have steered clear of promising independence. At a news conference Sunday in Salahuddin, where the KDP is headquartered, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said true representation in the central government should be considered the more important goal.
"The Kurdish political leaders have made it very clear that we want a united, federalist, pluralistic Iraq," said Zebari, the only Kurd to hold a top cabinet spot in Iraq's interim government.
An hour later, Massoud Barzani, president of the KDP, said he hoped to see an independent Kurdistan in his lifetime. "The people of Kurdistan have a right to their own state," he said.
So, again, why did Rice phone Barzani a couple weeks ago. Maybe we can gain some insight from thisState department press briefing on 4/25/05:
MR. ERELI: Welcome to our first briefing of the week, everybody. And I don't have anything to open up with, so we'll start with your questions.
QUESTION: On Iraq, about the reports that Secretary Rice and Vice President Cheney have been making -- have been having discussions with the Iraqis about accelerating the move to form a new government, can you just confirm for us the details about it? There's been some confusion whether or not she called Mr. Barzani or Mr. Talebani first.
And the other two questions I have is, two, does this reflect at this time a concern that the timetable will be upset for the rest of the procedures and also concern that's been expressed that security arrangements for trying to take on the insurgency are being hampered by the lack of a government?
MR. ERELI: Secretary of State Rice did speak with Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Massoud Barzani on Friday but I think it's -- and I'll tell you about the conversation, but I think let's -- it's important to take a step back and put this in perspective.
The Iraqis are in the process of putting together a coalition government as a result of the elections that took place in January and the Presidency Council that was formed about three weeks ago, this is the next step in the process. There are subsequent steps to the formation of a government. There is a -- frankly, a political scenario going forward to writing of a constitution and having elections by December of 2005.
So this is a process that the United States and, I think, the friends of Iraq have been following closely, working to support and helping the Iraqis, frankly, as they work their way through it, all the while respecting a fundamental principle, and that is that this is an Iraqi process that the choices of who runs Iraq, who serves in an Iraqi Government, are choices that Iraqis are going to make. So that's point one.
Point two. As I said, we've been in regular contact with them. I would note, as you well know, that Deputy Secretary Zoellick was in Iraq recently. He had a chance to meet with the Iraqi leadership. He had a chance to hear from them how they see this process moving forward, where they see it going and to listen about how things are working out and also to ask about, you know, where he, where they saw -- how they saw it playing out. So that was an important visit and important opportunity to hear from them just* to get an appreciation of the situation.
Vice President Abdul Al-Mahdi was in the United States, in Washington, last week. It was, I would say, a continuation of these kinds of consultations, these kinds of exchanges with senior officials in the White House and here at the State Department, again, to discuss with the Iraqi leadership, since he's the Vice President, the latest on developments to look ahead and see how things are playing out, what we in the international community can do to support Iraq, both in terms of the political developments but also let's remember there's the economic side of things and the security side of things, all of which are interrelated, all of which involve international support and, I think, concerted action.
And finally, in addition to the meetings with Al-Mahdi, the Secretary called Barzani and it was an opportunity to hear from him again about how things are going but also to make the point that, similar to what we've made in these other meetings, that we hope the process can move forward because Iraqis, like the rest of the world, are looking forward to a government taking power that can deal with the issues that Iraqis are facing and move on to the next steps in the process.
WTF does that mean? She called Barzani just to see how things were going, even though he's not part of the national Iraqi government? No mention of Barzani's stated wish for independence for Kurdistan in his lifetime? Surely the press will grill this State Department clown with heavy artillery.
QUESTION: Can I follow up? Obviously, you hope the process can move forward but are you concerned and is the Secretary concerned that the lack of having a government in place and the delay in putting one in place is having a negative impact on the gains that you feel you've made since and that the Iraqis have made since all these political processes and the election?
And on and on, but never any clarification as to why Rice called Barzani. Did she call al-Sistani? al-Sadr? al-Zarqawi?
Not one question as to whether or not she called Barzani to tell him to knock off the militant Kurdish dreams for an independent Kurdish state and to drop the demands that are part of the TAL that call for the reversal of the Arabization of Kirkuk. In other words, quit thinking that Bush really meant he was for "spreading democracy" in the Middle East in general, and Kurdistan in particular.
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| | | 54 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Sat, May 07, 2005, 22:55
|
OOPS! Missed this mention of Barzani in a May 4th State Department briefing:
QUESTION: And as we all know, the United States has had serious reservations about Mr. Chalabi. Does this conversation indicate that those are in the past or does the United States still have the same reservations about Mr. Chalabi?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't -- we've always shown respect for all the members of the Iraqi Government and I think, in this regard, the Secretary has reached out to members of the new government. She did speak yesterday with Foreign Minister Zebari to congratulate him on his reappointment as her counterpart and to discuss the situation with him. She also spoke yesterday with Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi. About a week or ten days ago, she spoke to Mr. Barzani and other deputy prime ministers. So she will keep in touch, I think, with various Iraqi leaders from time to time, either through their visits here or through her reaching out or the visits of some of her personnel just to keep in touch with what's going on out there. And I'd put these phone calls in that context.
Barzani? Deputy prime minister? Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi?
Congratulations you A Holes who have made holding government accountable the Satanic dynamic of liberal media bias. The reporters don't ask the right questions, the government spokesclown doesn't know a deputy prime minister from a regional parliamentiary president or convicted swindling Pentagon-favored lying criminal. LIBERAL MEDIA BIAS??
Give me a fvcking break.
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| | | 55 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Sat, May 07, 2005, 23:32
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Now the next two things I don't get is why we learn about these things before anyone has time to question him and roll up his network.
Even Boldwin's friends at NewsMax admit:
Al-Libbi's name was not on the FBI list of most wanted terrorist
Further,
However, Vince Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA's counterterrorism center, said that did not mean that the rest of the intelligence community didn't want him - badly. "In intelligence circles, he was certainly considered the No. 3 man," he said.
Thanks, Vince. Now back to your job as consultant for the Carlyle Group.
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| | | 56 | Cosmo's Cod Piece
ID: 11314719
Sun, May 08, 2005, 13:15
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The Iraqi parliament has approved appointments for six cabinet vacancies, handing four more positions to the Sunni Arab minority.
"
But the Sunni selected as human rights minister turned down the job, saying he cannot accept a position awarded on sectarian criteria.
Less than half of the National Assembly, 112 of the 155 legislators present, approved Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari's six nominations on Sunday, including Shia Arab Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum as oil minister and Sunni military man Saadoun al-Duleimi as defence minister.
The other four designated ministers were Hashim Abdul-Rahman al-Shibli, a Sunni, as human rights minister; Mihsin Shlash, a Shia, as electricity minister; Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni, as industry minister; and Abed Mutlak al-Jiburi, a Sunni, as a deputy prime minister.
President Jalal Talabani approved
the cabinet appointments
However, al-Shibli told a news briefing that he could not accept his appointment.
"Concentrating on sectarian identities leads to divisions in the society and state, and for that reason I respectfully decline the post," al-Shibli said.
Reasons for refusal
Speaking to Aljazeera from Baghdad, al-Shibli explained that there were two reasons for refusing to accept the post.
"Firstly, I was surprised being assigned to assume the post of Human Rights Minister since I was not asked before the announcment
"But secondly, I have been appointed to represent the Sunni Arabs - a matter that contradicts my thoughts, beliefs and principles."
The new government, most of which was sworn in last week, includes 17 Shia ministers, eight Kurds, six Sunnis and a Christian.
Three deputy premiers have also been named, one each for the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds.
A fourth deputy premiership remains vacant; al-Jaafari has said he hopes to appoint a woman to the position.
"All sectors of Iraq"
Addressing the media after the vote, al-Jaafari said the long wait for a new government was not in vain.
"The need to represent all sectors of Iraq was the reason for the delay," he said.
"Dialogue and assessments were given good time so that the ministers would be supported by the majority of the National Assembly." He added.
President Jalal Talabani and his two vice presidents signed off on the names before they were submitted to the 270-member National Assembly for a vote."
QUAGMIRE!!!!
QUAGMIRE!!!!
QUAGMIRE!!!!
Maybe the Liberal Horde who suffers from brain lepersy was right. Democracy cannot take hold in Iraq. More condensendating BS from a bunch of hippie wuss pro-rape room, anti-human rights chicken-hawks.
I sure hope the folks in Maine have stocked up on canned goods, sandbags, and ammo. The amphibious invasion by the Fedayeen via Iceland is no doubt going to happen now.
Before one of you brain lepers goes off and says I got this from a lopsided site. You're right, I did, Al-Jazeera.
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| | | 57 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Sun, May 08, 2005, 13:36
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Nice to see CCP expanding his horizons by auditioning for a spot as a writer on Comedy Central. Just to be safe, though, don't quit your accountant job.
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| | | 58 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 12446816
Sun, May 08, 2005, 18:04
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More condensendating [sic] BS from a bunch of hippie wuss pro-rape room, anti-human rights chicken-hawks.
Does that mean that the folks to the left of you are better at creating water in it's liquid form?
Maybe you could lecture us on Bushes human rights record as you ignore the fact that he oversaw the executions of 152 prisoners during his tenure as govenor.
Or the fact that under his direction we have joined China, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iran and Pakistan as the only countries in the world to execute juveniles.
I'm sure none of the estimated 21,500 dead Iraqi civilians would argue with his outstanding efforts on behalf of human rights. It's ironic that John Negroponte (with his attendant death squad experience in Central America) is his ambassador there, no?
Abu Ghraib.
If you're going to be condescending and mean spirited, at least pick a better subject you ignorant, bigoted, narrow-minded, hawkish (so long as you don't have to serve) jack@ss.
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| | | 59 | Cosmo's Cod Piece
ID: 11314719
Sun, May 08, 2005, 18:11
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Sox: "If you're going to be condescending and mean spirited, at least pick a better subject you ignorant, bigoted, narrow-minded, hawkish (so long as you don't have to serve) jack@ss."
Testy aren't we? You must've bounced another check today and got nailed with a fee.
"Maybe you could lecture us on Bushes human rights record as you ignore the fact that he oversaw the executions of 152 prisoners during his tenure as govenor."
Did he just randomly select people off the streets? These didn't happen to be murderers were they? I'm sure only fine upstanding citizens of the community sat in "Old Sparky" while Bush was governor.
Who you crappin'?
So you're in favor of keeping serial killers alive and you don't want women and children to be saved from rape, molestation, and torture?
You're making your stance crystal clear.
You're a pathetic piece of crap.
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| | | 60 | Tree
ID: 28430321
Sun, May 08, 2005, 18:48
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Six car bombs exploded in separate locations in Baghdad and in the northern city of Mosul, killing 12 Iraqis and wounding 44 others, a local official said. The bombings came a day after a suicide attack during the funeral of a Kurdish official killed about 25 people.
CCP, it's been 2 1/2 years we've been in Iraq. 1,600 U.S. soldiers have died, and another 200 coalition troops have died.
an untallied amount of Iraqi civilians have died, certainly well into the thousands, and probably into the tens of thousands. God knows how many of those were children.
how dare you call someone else a pathetic piece of crap as you gloat over the deaths of all these people?
so take off your cheerleading skirt, sit down, and shut the f*ck up.
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| | | 61 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 343818
Sun, May 08, 2005, 19:06
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*laughing*
CCP, you're quite possibly the funniest poster here.
Not only do you not bother to post anything of any real worth or with any heft behind your arguments, but you repeatedly engage in ad hominem attacks punctuated by name calling and any number of other childish antics.
Grow up and stop acting like a petulant little boy.
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| | | 62 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 343818
Sun, May 08, 2005, 19:39
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And since you only seem to understand the lowest common denominator let me use pictures to help you understand, for the record, my credentials as far as being categorized a "hippie wuss pro-rape room, anti-human rights chicken-hawk".
 
  
For someone who's never heard a shot fired in anger, you're awful gung-ho, and while I really have nothing more to say, I'd like to note that if you're enjoying the ability to post your bile on these boards, you're welcome.
And if you'd like to criticise my service, GO EARN THE RIGHT TO. Until then, please keep your comments to yourself.
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| | | 63 | sarge33rd
ID: 32436810
Sun, May 08, 2005, 19:39
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but sox, he is a petulant little boy. Hence, his conduct is not only predictable, but appropriate.
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| | | 64 | Myboyjack
ID: 121159118
Sun, May 08, 2005, 19:49
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I'd like to note that if you're enjoying the ability to post your bile on these boards, you're welcome.
And if you'd like to criticise my service, GO EARN THE RIGHT TO. Until then, please keep your comments to yourself.
Oh geez. Little full of ourselves today? sox, I don't owe you for the "ability to post on these boards". As for someone needing "earning the right" to criticize or comment on these boards....WTF? Get a clue.
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| | | 65 | Cosmo's Cod Piece
ID: 11314719
Sun, May 08, 2005, 19:55
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Sox: "And if you'd like to criticise my service, GO EARN THE RIGHT TO. Until then, please keep your comments to yourself."
Therefore, do you only believe that people who serve in the military have a right to comment on the military?
To envision your perfect state of government then, you'd be for saving the lives of serial killers, in favor of raping and molesting women and children and only allow soldiers to have opinions.
How did Saddam get a computer with an internet connection in his cell?
"anything of any real worth"
A.K.A. anything that doesn't agree 100% with what the liberals say.
"heft behind your arguments"
I posted a link from Al-Jazeera. Not even an American hating socialist like yourself could possibly say that network is pro-American or pro-Bush.
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| | | 66 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 57421819
Sun, May 08, 2005, 20:23
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Umm...f*ck you and f*ck you. And apologies mbj, but I'm frustrated as hell.
Obviously, mbj, anyone can post whatever they want here, but ccp's over the top bullsh*t is more than I can stand.
It's the same "if you're not with Bush/the christian right/neoconservative agenda you hate America" crap that we're innundated with every day. CCP is a perfect example of an essentially ignorant, soft, never been there, absofukinlootely no idea what he's talking about @sshole that seems to be ubiquitous in the American body politic today. Who the f*ck is he to question my love for this country or my patriotism. Why? Because I have a markedly different POV about how we should use our influence and economic and military might? Because I think that prudence dictates more velvet glove and less iron fist? Because I see Americas standing in the world diminishing, rather than increasing? Because I believe we blew an incredible and historic chance to change the world dramatically post September 11th, but Bush frittered away the opportunity both at home and abroad? Because I don't believe that we should suspend criticism of the president simply because of an unjust war in Iraq? Because we failed to finish the job in Afghanistan? Because I think it's apparent that the current administration's loyalties lie with the network of wealthy donors who funded W's campaign, rather than with the welfare of the american people?
I'm sick to death of being told that I'm not "a reel Americun" because I don't suck at the teat of the right wing.
And it's time for another break from this forum, because the cacaphony of idiotic voices who post little of any real value while constantly badmouthing the dissenting viewpoint is becoming too much to bear yet again. Apparently, being a loudmouthed dick and making personal attacks are the only criteria for posting now.
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| | | 67 | Tree
ID: 28430321
Sun, May 08, 2005, 21:36
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Sox - i hope you choose to make your absence short-lived. this forum needs more people like you with a voice of experience and reason, not less.
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| | | 68 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Sun, May 08, 2005, 22:47
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You'll barely be gone at all. Yer addicted. I'm trying to break it myself, not that you could tell. 8/
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| | | 69 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Wed, May 18, 2005, 10:12
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From my post #53,
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party, on Friday to ask him to finish forming a government as soon as possible, two State Department officials said Monday.
That was about a month ago. I expressed my puzzlement as to why Rice would be calling Barzani requesting help in forming the government, when he's not even part of the national government. The government never offered any details on why Rice phoned Barzani, except to say later in a press briefing,
the Secretary called Barzani and it was an opportunity to hear from him again about how things are going
A few days ago, Rice made a suprise visit to Iraq.
Before visiting the capital, Rice's first stop in this war-weary country was in the town of Salahuddin, in Kurdish northern Iraq. There she urged patience for the fragile new government and said Iraqis have made remarkable political progress that can overcome a recent surge of violence.
Rice flew immediately to the mountain stronghold of Kurdish Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani. She rode in a military helicopter under extremely heavy security
Doesn't anyone find this Rice/Barzani connection to be confusing. She makes a suprise trip to Iraq and immediately meets with someone completely unrelated to the Iraqi government, but the leader of the Kurdish semi-autonomous government and a proponent for an independent Kurdistan.
Jalabani may be the Kurdish Iraqi president, but it seems obvious to me that Rice is courting Barzani in an attempt to convince him to abandon his dream of a separate and independent Kurdistan.
Why else would he be higher on list of Iraqi VIPs than al-Jafaari and Jalabani? And why has the MSM(or any other media for that matter) completely ignored the curious relationship between Rice and Barzani?
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| | | 70 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Tue, May 31, 2005, 17:48
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Chalabi uses a couple more of his 9 lives
Most top government leaders would have sought passage aboard American military helicopters or transport planes, but not Mr. Chalabi, who appears eager not to be seen as a beneficiary of American favor. Leaving Baghdad shortly before 9 a.m., with guards pointing their rifles through open windows, his caravan included three other senior government officials - a Sunni, a Kurd and a Shiite. It sped north across a landscape littered with the wreckage of war, passing a burning Humvee, roadside arrests of civilians at gunpoint and charred tractor-trailers ambushed as they carried supplies to American bases.
The scene seemed enough to discourage the most committed: a bridge across the Tigris was wrecked, with a giant section missing where it had been hit by American bombs, and beneath it large-diameter oil pipelines dangling uselessly into the river. When temporary pipes were laid after the war, they were blown up by insurgents, leaving only a smaller, 16-inch pipe to carry the crude, protected only by coils of razor wire. With damage like this at numerous points along the network, exports from Iraq's northern oil fields have virtually disappeared, at a cost of $90 million in lost revenue this year.
Another deputy prime minister, Abed Mutlak al-Jabouri, who joined Mr. Chalabi on his expedition, became anxious, saying quietly that he feared an insurgent attack. But Mr. Chalabi stood his ground. Looking up at the pipeline, he called for all involved, including several Iraqi Army officers who had come along, to be resolute. "The issue is to protect it, not just to fix it," he said.
Mr. Chalabi struck what has become for him a familiar theme, since his falling-out with the Bush administration last year, that of what he sees as American incompetence and interference.
In Al Fattah, the United States pledged to rebuild the crossing in 2003, and had allotted $60 million for the project, Mr. Chalabi said. The line must be fixed to restart Iraq's oil exports. They stand at about 1.5 million barrels a day, according to the Oil Ministry, far less than what they were before the war, but so far, no work has been started.
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| | | 71 | biliruben
ID: 531202411
Wed, Jul 13, 2005, 09:41
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A Hawk starts asking the right questions, as his son goes to war.
But a pundit should not recommend a policy without adequate regard for the ability of those in charge to execute it, and here I stumbled. I could not imagine, for example, that the civilian and military high command would treat "Phase IV" -- the post-combat period that has killed far more Americans than the "real" war -- as of secondary importance to the planning of Gen. Tommy Franks's blitzkrieg. I never dreamed that Ambassador Paul Bremer and Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the two top civilian and military leaders early in the occupation of Iraq -- brave, honorable and committed though they were -- would be so unsuited for their tasks, and that they would serve their full length of duty nonetheless. I did not expect that we would begin the occupation with cockamamie schemes of creating an immobile Iraqi army to defend the country's borders rather than maintain internal order, or that the under-planned, under-prepared and in some respects mis-manned Coalition Provisional Authority would seek to rebuild Iraq with big construction contracts awarded under federal acquisition regulations, rather than with small grants aimed at getting angry, bewildered young Iraqi men off the streets and into jobs.
I did not know, but I might have guessed.
Read it all. Honesty is refreshing.
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| | | 72 | biliruben
Leader
ID: 589301110
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 13:17
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| | | 73 | Razor
ID: 36241218
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 14:22
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Great comic.
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| | | 74 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 14:43
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Pop quiz
What is the literal meaning of Islam, the word.
answer: absolute submission
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| | | 75 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 14:43
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Just ask them. They all know it. It's like an open secret.
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| | | 76 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 15:16
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Main Entry: Is·lam
Pronunciation: is-'läm, iz-, -'lam, 'is-", 'iz-"
Function: noun
Etymology: Arabic islAm submission (to the will of God)
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| | | 77 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 23528248
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 15:24
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So what?
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| | | 78 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 23528248
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 15:35
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"So what" to 74 that is.
Or do you mean to tell me that you're making a distinction between a muslim submitting to gods will and an evangelical christian doing the exact same thing?
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| | | 79 | sarge33rd
ID: 45522117
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 15:47
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thre ya go again sox, with that "moral equivalency" thing that boldy gets so worked up over. geeeeeeez
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| | | 80 | Madman
ID: 43410119
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 15:51
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So what?? So what?? So what?????
If you can't understand the political ramifications of the desire for religious, totalitarian, Islamic states, then you can't understand modern Islamic terrorism and the reason why we've been drug into this war and why, without knowing it, we were presenting a mortal threat to many of these people's dearest beliefs.
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| | | 81 | Mattinglyinthehall
ID: 2824911
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 16:04
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the political ramifications of the desire for religious, totalitarian, Islamic states
There's a considerable leap from obeying God's will to forcing it on everyone as the law of the land.
I'll point out that the term 'evangelical', on the other hand, comes directly from the notion that it is every Christian's duty to convert nonbelievers.
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| | | 82 | Madman
ID: 43410119
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 16:28
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There's a considerable leap from obeying God's will to forcing it on everyone as the law of the land.
Oh my goodness. That's not what I'm talking about at all. Many early Islamic countries wouldn't even ALLOW conversion, because it would erode their tax base (or, alternatively, they were concerned that people would convert for financial rather than religious reasons).
What I'm talking about is Islamism or Pan-Islamism, a term I've used in this forum. I presume this is what Baldwin was getting at. I can't keep my terms straight, so maybe this is my fault. But, essentially, Islam's relationship to the state has always been relatively tight and, I would argue, destructive. The original caliphate is a case in point, and the modern "fundamentalism" (also a misnomer) desires a return to Islamic government.
Christianity's roots were actually *outside* of government. It took a few hundred years before the church got intertwined with Rome, and even throughout the Middle Ages, the Church and the King were not synonymous.
In contrast, Islam has a rich and deep tradition as a political movement. This makes many variants of Islam especially noxious to Westerners (or, they would say, the West's secular governmental systems are especially noxious to them). At any rate, this, I would argue, is the single biggest issue behind the WoT; this is just one reason why Iraq's government has tremendous strategic value. This is also why we *do* have a war on our hands. Our basic Western secular principles are entirely incompatible with Islamicism.
Lastly, this is why I have repeatedly pointed out on this forum that many American variants of Islam, which tend to reject Islamism either by law or inspiration, could do great good if we could export them to the Middle East ... much like some of the toleration built into our Protestantism by necessity has proven to be useful to help pacify the entire "Christian" world (although, to be honest, Europe had to figure some of this out on their own through their own troubles).
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| | | 83 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 18:12
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Many early Islamic countries wouldn't even ALLOW conversion, because it would erode their tax base - Madman
They got hooked on all that dhimmi income? I was unaware of that and find it unlikely but if you can show me...
Islamism or Pan-Islamism, a term I've used in this forum. I presume this is what Baldwin was getting at. I can't keep my terms straight - Madman
Add to that list salafism, all the same thing.
MITH
One religion was told to put away the sword as "he who lives by the sword dies by the sword".
While the other was told to go convert the entire world by the sword.
Why you can't get such a monumental difference thru your head must be because you don't find the truth useful.
An odd inversion exists. You have to disobey the Bible to pick up a sword. My reading of many many passages of the koran tell me you have to disobey the koran to be peaceful.
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| | | 84 | Cosmo's Cod Piece
ID: 11314719
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 19:21
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Boldwin: This is OT, but "My reading of many many passages of the koran tell me you have to disobey the koran to be peaceful."
Seriously, I'd like to read the Koran just to know what the "enemy" is believing in. Isn't it blasphemy for a Catholic to pick up a text of another religion?
You have every right to practice your religion your way, but you seem very in-the-know about Christianity and I was wondering if that practice was acceptable.
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| | | 85 | Boldwin
ID: 543312819
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 19:58
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Well I certainly wouldn't read the koran for spiritual edification if that is what you mean. On the otherhand when spreading the good news it is useful to know what the other guy believes.
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| | | 86 | Cosmo's Cod Piece
ID: 11314719
Fri, Jul 15, 2005, 20:58
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I most definitely would never imply you used the Koran for some spiritual advice. I was only interested in if it broke some Christian religious law. Thank you for the advice.
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| | | 87 | Boldwin
ID: 49626249
Fri, Aug 05, 2005, 15:17
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RIP Steven Vincent, brave freelance journalist.
He was abducted by armed men in a police car after having reported that British military was turning a blind eye towards Shiite radicals [such as Sadr's] who had infiltrated the police in Basra and even had a death car, a white Toyota, that they used to drive around assassins.
No word on the fate of his female translator who was also abducted.
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| | | 88 | biliruben
Leader
ID: 589301110
Fri, Aug 05, 2005, 15:19
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Heard about him. Hard to figure out of he was extraordinarily brave or stupid. Had no tolerance for the treatment of women as a lesser sex. Solid dude.
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| | | 89 | Boldwin
ID: 49626249
Fri, Aug 05, 2005, 15:25
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This seems to be his blog. Further reading has revealed the translator was seriously injured but apparently not now in the hands of the assassins.
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| | | 90 | Perm Dude
Dude
ID: 030792616
Sat, Aug 06, 2005, 00:24
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Just got my hands on a copy of Baghdad Burning, which reproduces the first year of a girl blogger from Iraq named Riverbend.
Fascinating inside stuff.
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| | | 91 | Pancho Villa
Sustainer
ID: 533817
Thu, Aug 11, 2005, 22:14
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The Bush administration has been pressuring the Kurdish contingency to relent on the main issues of federalism and Sharia law in order to get a constitutional draft by the Monday deadline. Whatever compromises are made in the draft are meaningless if not ratified by the provinces, and the Kurds have what amounts to a 3 province veto.
Now, however, an entirely new wrinkle has presented itself, as Shiite religious leaders demand autonomy for Southern Iraq.
NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Shi’ite Islamist leaders hammered home demands for an autonomous federal state for their people across oil-rich southern Iraq on Thursday, four days before a deadline for agreeing a new constitution.
Minority Sunni Arab leaders, as well as a spokesman for the Shi’ite-led coalition government, rejected the idea and it was unclear whether the split would hold up delivery of a draft text that Washington hopes can help quell the Sunni insurgency.
At an impassioned mass rally in Najaf, heartland of Shi’ite Islam, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution Abdul Aziz al-Hakim turned up the pressure on his opponents from ethnic and religious minorities as the head of his party’s military wing derided central government in Baghdad.
"Regarding federalism, we think that it is necessary to form one entire region in the south," said Hakim, leader of SCIRI, and a powerful force in the coalition that came to power in January’s election, secured by U.S. military occupation.
Shi’ites account for about 60 percent of Iraq’s people and the issue of autonomy raises major concerns for the country’s ability to hold together and for the division of its oil wealth.
Sunni Arabs, dominant under Saddam Hussein, other minorities and secular Shi’ites wary of religious rule have been opposing the idea of a constitution that would allow southern Shi’ites the kind of autonomy now enjoyed de facto by Kurds in the north.
"Federalism has to be in all of Iraq. They are trying to prevent the Shi’ites from enjoying their own federalism," said Hadi al-Amery, head of the Badr movement, a militia organization formed by SCIRI when it was fighting Saddam from Iranian exile.
"What have we got from the central government but death?"
So the Bush administration now finds itself in the ironic position of being ideologically aligned mainly with the Sunni minority, which barely registered a blip in the elections, and is at the heart of the insurgency.
I think it's safe to assume that Iraq is officially a quagmire.
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| | | 92 | Catfish
Leader
ID: 035262811
Fri, Aug 12, 2005, 10:47
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Quagmire possibly, but here's a report from The Times which suggests that the US government still is following the money as its real agenda in Iraq.
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| | | 93 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 23528248
Fri, Aug 12, 2005, 17:54
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Was there ever really any question that the invasion of Iraq wasn't about money, the consolidation of power and the "haves" getting their hands on more?[T]he first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and Commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to it's nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. What were witnessing is the very pinnacle of the military/industrial complex at it's "finest" and worst. "Finest" because the Iraq war demonstrates the M/I complex at it's best: well-oiled, and operating with deadly efficency. It's worst, because we grossly misjudged the type of war we were getting involved in.
In Iraq, the neoconservative junta that occupies the seats of power in this administration are trying to turn a 4th generation war (a war with non-state entities) into a 2nd generation war (a war against another state that can be conquered by the application of firepower to targets).
The question is: Why, and, who benefits?
Certainly not the Iraqi people - the center of power of this war definitely isn't in Baghdad thanks to Paul Bremer and his 100 orders.
Not "democracy", as we watch the idea that a US occupied Iraq could blossom into an effective system (and would have a domino effect on the Middle East) die a slow death at our own hands as we try to force it into being less a true democracy and more a US friendly puppet regime.
Not US long term strategic interests. As counter-intuitive as that may seem, think about it for a minute. Strategically, Iraq isn't the key to very much. (Except, says the cynical Northeasterner, oil.) Iraq isn't a key to Iran. To the contrary - Iran finds herself in a much stronger position to influence what goes on inside Iraq. Iraq isn't a key to Syria or Saudi Arabia or any of the other states in the ME. Lebanon is cooling down after the highs of the Cedar Revolution. Turkey (already a democracy and our closest ally and most moderate state in the region) is more threatened than ever by the idea of an independent Kurdish state, or at least stronger Kurd control of northern Iraq and all of the headaches that that scenario brings. Let's not forget that all the borders we're currently dealing with were arbitrairly drawn to best benefit Anglo and Franco interests after WWII.
If von Clausewitz were still alive, he would be admonishing us that we are in danger of marching to our own defeat by not paying attention to the lessons that we've learned up to this point. More importantly, I don't think it's been adequately discussed here (for myriad reasons, chief among them being that our resident christian contingent doesn't tolerate dissent well) that we're dealing with the conflict between Islam and "the West" as a continuation of 1,400 years of competition between two expansionist cultures, both with strong missionary traditions (both assert that they represent the one true faith and that they have a duty to convert all unbelievers) and both with deeply rooted traditions of religion based nationalism.
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| | | 94 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 23528248
Fri, Aug 12, 2005, 18:05
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A little bit more disgusting "follow the money" news.It's easy to forget sometimes - amidst all the lofty talk of geopolitics, of apocalyptic clashes between good and evil, of terror, liberty, security and God - that the war on Iraq is "largely a matter of loot," as Kasper Gutman so aptly described the Crusades in that seminal treatise on human nature, The Maltese Falcon. And nowhere is this more evident than in the festering, oozing imposthume of corruption centered around the Gutman-like figure of Dick Cheney.
Yes, it's once more into the breach with Halliburton, the gargantuan government contractor that still pays Cheney, its former CEO, enormous annual sums in "deferred compensation" and stock options - even while, as "the most powerful vice president in American history," he presides over a White House war council that has steered more than $10 billion in no-bid Iraqi war contracts back to his corporate paymaster. This is rainmaking of monsoon proportions. Indeed, the company's military servicing wing, KBR, announced a second-quarter profit spike of 284 percent last week - a feast of blood and gravy that will send Cheney's stock options soaring into the stratosphere.
But although Halliburton has already entered the American lexicon as a by-word for rampant cronyism - the butt of a thousand late-night TV jokes and water-cooler witticisms - the true extent of its dense and deadly web of graft is only now emerging, most recently in a remarkable public hearing that revealed some of the corporation's standard business practices in Iraq: fraud, extortion, brutality, pilferage, theft - even serving rotten food to American soldiers in the battle zone.
By piecing together bits from the fiercely-suppressed and censored reports of a few honest Pentagon auditors and investigators, a joint House-Senate minority committee (the GOP majority refused to take part) has unearthed at least $1.4 billion in fraudulent overcharges and unsourced billing by Cheney's former company in Iraq. Testimony from Pentagon whistleblowers, former Halliburton officials and fellow contractors revealed the picture of a rogue operation, power-drunk and arrogant, beyond the reach of law, secure in the protection of its White House sugar daddy.
One tale is particularly instructive: Halliburton's strenuous efforts to prevent a company hired by the Iraqis, Lloyd-Owen International, from delivering gasoline into the conquered land from Kuwait for 18 cents a gallon. Why? Because LOI's cost-efficient operation undercuts Halliburton's price of $1.30 a gallon for the exact same service.
But how is Halliburton able to interfere with the sacred process of free enterprise? Well, it seems that Cheney's firm, a private company, has control over the U.S. military checkpoint on the volatile Iraq-Kuwait border, and also has the authority to grant - or withhold - the Pentagon ID cards that are indispensable for contractors operating in Iraq. (Even contractors who, like LOI, are working for the supposedly sovereign Iraqi government.) Halliburton used these powers to block LOI's access to the military crossing - which provides quick, safe delivery of the fuel - for months. Then the game got rougher.
In June, Cheney's boys blackmailed LOI into delivering some construction materials to a Halliburton project in the friendly confines of Fallujah: no delivery, no "golden ticket" Pentagon card, said Halliburton. They neglected to tell LOI that convoys on the route had been repeatedly hit by insurgents in recent days. And sure enough, LOI's delivery trucks were ripped to shreds just outside a Halliburton-operated military base: three men were killed and seven wounded. But that's not all. An email obtained by investigators revealed that Halliburton brass expressly prohibited company employees from offering any assistance to the shattered convoy.
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| | | 95 | Seattle Zen
ID: 178161719
Sat, Aug 13, 2005, 13:08
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Post 94
One more reason for "why" is the permanence of the US military bases that will populate Iraq. We cannot always rely upon the Saudi government remaining in power. If the Wahabbis overthrow the House of Saud, we would certainly have to leave the country. We must have a military presence in the Middle East to maintain our hegemony, Iraq will soon be our "closest ally".
It doesn't take a genius to see that our auto-centric economy would be brought to its knees by a serious, long term increase in gasoline prices.
From the Times article post 93 (you have to go abroad to hear of our most egregious profit mongering in the media)
Order 81, for example, has the status of binding law over “patent industrial design, undisclosed information, integrated circuits and plant variety” — a degree of detailed supervision normally associated with a Soviet command-and-control economy. While historically the Iraqi Constitution prohibited private ownership of biological resources, the new US-imposed patent law introduces a system of monopoly rights over seeds. This is virtually a takeover of Iraqi agriculture.
The rights granted to US plant breeding companies under this order include the exclusive right to produce, reproduce, sell, export, import and store the plant varieties covered by intellectual property right for the next 20-25 years. During this extended period nobody can plant or otherwise use plants, trees or vines without compensating the breeder.
In the name of agricultural reconstruction this new law deprives Iraqi farmers of their inherent right, exercised for the past 10,000 years in the fertile Mesopotamian arc, to save and replant seeds. It enables the penetration of Iraqi agriculture by Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow Chemical and other corporate giants that control the global seed trade. Food sovereignty for the Iraqi people has therefore already been made near-impossible by these new regulations.
I brought this topic to our attention eight months ago and no one dared defend it, why is this still in place?
It all fuçking disgusts me!
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| | | 96 | Stuck in the 60s
Dude
ID: 274132811
Sat, Aug 13, 2005, 16:07
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Re: 99
That our soldiers are dying so that these policies can be promulgated, enforced and defended is so sad. Have any deaths ever been more pointless, or any American regime more corrupt?
Don
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| | | 97 | Boldwin
ID: 49626249
Sat, Aug 13, 2005, 18:21
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International corporations are obviously out of control when they can push that kind of thing thru. Globalization is a bad thing no matter who is pushing it, even guys you 'thot' were on our side.
International corporations aren't looking out for anyone but themselves and politicians are only puppets for the people buying their election campaigns. We keep treating politicians like the real players.
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| | | 98 | biliruben
Leader
ID: 589301110
Tue, Aug 16, 2005, 17:09
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WWDDD
Bizarro world.
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| | | 99 | Tree
Sustainer
ID: 599393013
Tue, Aug 16, 2005, 17:45
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man. i wish i hadn't read that. i really wish i hadn't.
this war has nothing to do with Israel, or Jews, and to paint it as such is absolutely anti-Semetic.
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| | | 100 | biliruben
Leader
ID: 589301110
Tue, Aug 16, 2005, 18:00
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Just a reminder that the enemy of your enemy can still be your enemy!
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| | | 101 | Myboyjack
Dude
ID: 014826271
Tue, Aug 16, 2005, 20:21
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An anti-semetic Klansman? Say it ain't so.
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| | | 102 | bibA
Sustainer
ID: 261028117
Tue, Aug 16, 2005, 20:44
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Sarge - I just heard an analyst on Fox, an ex-Lt.General (McNinnernan?), respond to the ascertion that the U.S. is in trouble in Iraq as evidenced by there being twice as many insurgent attacks today than there were a year ago. The analyst said that this ascertion is actually an indication that we are winning, and that the insurgency is losing and desperate, that they are increasing their attacks as a last ditch effort. This make sense to you?
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| | | 103 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 23528248
Wed, Aug 17, 2005, 12:25
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It makes little to no sense, especially given the fact that the insurgents are well aware of the fact that the success of their efforts are likely to be measured in decades, not months or years. It was one of the first and most important lessons imparted by the muj war in Afghanistan vs Russia.
The analyist sounds like so many other retired experts (as well as current DoD fat cats) still fighting the last war, desperate to claim "victory" in a third generation (manuver or "shock and awe" warfare) engagement when this struggle is clearly of the fourth generation (guerilla or insurgent) variety.
We desperately need to change our mindset, which will only improve our strategic planning.
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| | | 105 | Tree
Sustainer
ID: 599393013
Wed, Aug 17, 2005, 12:49
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Iraq Leader Paves Way for Legal Hangings
good to see progress in Iraq. not only are they following Bush in his zeal to murder, they're doing things like 1880 Texas.
three cheers for President Talabushi!
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| | | 106 | sarge33rd
ID: 344362512
Wed, Aug 17, 2005, 13:32
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re 102...
saw a very simial interview/comment and thought that it was an "old school" officer trying to draw parallels between now and the VC/Tet Offensive of '68(IIRC).
By the time of Tet, the NVC were a beaten army. Not unlike Hitlers vaunted forces when he launched the "Battle of the Bulge". What traditional military thinkers tend to overlook IMO, is the social impact of these last-ditch all out counteroffensives. I dont believe they are so much geared toward a decisive military angagement, as they are intended to demonstrate to the masses on both sides, the extent to which they are willing to go in order to prosecute their perceived adversary. This in turn, vreates sympathy amongst those with similar socio-economic backgrounds and fear amongst those in the opposition camp. (a little "shock and awe" anyone?) The military benefit derived, isnt immediate as was Japans bombing of Pearl Harbor, but is more long-term in the obtaining and fulfilling. Longterm, becuase it sets its own roots, into the social structure of the region. As time marches ever on, that society grows up with these values and thus adopts them. (Win the war via the hearts and minds, not the corpses.)
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| | | 107 | bibA
Sustainer
ID: 261028117
Wed, Aug 17, 2005, 15:27
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Well I guess we sure don't want a reduction in insurgent attacks then, if it is a victory we are after. It appears that these experts are hoping that this time next year there will be twice as many insurgent attacks again.
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| | | 108 | sarge33rd
ID: 344362512
Wed, Aug 17, 2005, 16:48
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"hoping", is the key word there bibA. IMHO, this administration has o plan for Iraq...they do though have "hopes". They hope it will all work out, they hope for the best, they hope its pretty much over by the mid-term elections.
From my view, I hope the voting American wakes the hell up.
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| | | 109 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 38727189
Thu, Aug 18, 2005, 11:11
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But wouldn't you agree that there are enormous differences between the NVA and the insurgency in Iraq, sarge? Chief among them being the fact that the "anti-government forces" in Iraq are operating as assymetrical cells with little or no cohesion or common political agenda other than the defeat of the US. The NVA on the other hand, were organized more along the lines of a conventional army, and definitely had a cohesive political and social message. The Vietnamese were effective at crippling a superior military power and eventually triumphed with the use of conventional forces; I doubt the loose alliance of ex-Baathists, Sunni and Shias extremists, former Iraqi military, criminals and likely outside (be they state supported Iranian, Syrian, or Saudi intelligence agents, motivated private citizens of the same, or trans-national groups like al Quaeda) elements will unify behind any one ideal beyond the defeat of the "Great Satan".
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| | | 110 | Seattle Zen
ID: 178161719
Thu, Aug 18, 2005, 11:59
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| | | 111 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 38727189
Thu, Aug 18, 2005, 14:08
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While we're talking about how wonderful it is to be delivering democracy to the Middle East, let's take a look at Article 14 of the new "democratic" Iraqi constitution; It's the "secularization" of strict Islamic law. It gives clerics the authority to deny women the rights of freedom of movement and travel, inheritance, and child custody. It legalizes forced marriages, non-consensual polygamy, compulsory religious dress, domestic abuse, execution by stoning as punishment for female adultery, and public flogging of women for disobeying religious rules.
Naturally, the Bushies chose the politically expedient route of selecting hard line right-wingers when appointing a ruling class for Iraq (birds of a feather and all). In 2003, Bremmer hand-picked several clerics for the Iraqi Governing Council, all of whom had publicly stated their commitment to restricting women's rights. He also stopped an effort to pass laws criminalizing domestic violence.
Nice.
As the current de facto administrators, we're legally responsible under international law for this constitutional drafting process as long as Iraq is under US military occupation. Are we condoning this behavior now? And where can I sign up for the no-fault polygamy program?
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| | | 112 | soxzeitgeist
ID: 199531715
Sun, Nov 13, 2005, 09:13
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What the f*ck is this guy doing back in the halls of power of the Bush administration?
If I was Chalabi, and I was still able to work behind the stamp of the U.S. government*, I'd be smiling too.
*Despite being a suspect in telling the Iranian government that America had broken the code it used for secret communications - a charge raised by the administration itself, as well as an issue the White House said could "get people killed". (When this information came to light 17 months ago, Condi Rice promised a criminal investigation of the charges. But close to a year and a half later, the FBI has still not questioned Chalabi, because he has been "out of the country and unavailable". WELL HERE HE IS!) But he'll wrap up his visit with the neo-con cabal without so much as a cursory question and answser session with the FBI or the Senate intelligence committee (or at least its Democratic members) who are moving to the investigation into the Bush administration’s use of false and misleading intelligence to help sell the war.
Just for giggles, let's review his credentials for meeting with the SECSTATE and VP:
* the prime source of trumped up claims about Saddam's WMD
* lied to everyone in sight about intel while pocketing $340,000 a month from the US government
* tried to sabotage the UN's efforts to put in place an interim government in Iraq
* helped the White House Iraq Group sell the war by regularly passing faulty intel to Judy Miller
* introduced Curveball, another bogus source on WMD, to the intelligence community
* was accused of spying for the Iranians
* controls a group of thugs under investigation for fraud, torture, kidnapping, and misuse of U.S. funds
* was convicted in abstentia of embezzling millions of dollars in Jordan in the 1980s
What a piece of sh*t, and what a piece of sh*t administration for continuing to prop him up in Iraq.
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| | | 113 | Boldwin
ID: 49626249
Thu, Mar 02, 2006, 18:59
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How? He knows the secret handshake.
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| | | 115 | Perm Dude
ID: 11544178
Wed, Jun 18, 2008, 10:33
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KBR Army contract overseer fired for not approving $1 billion in questionable charges.
I'm so pissed about this story I can't even comment on it without getting extremely snarky about this Administration. Anyone who thinks that taxes are too high should seriously think about which candidate will get us out of this huge mess in Iraq and which one wants to keep paying companies like KBR to screw us over for decades to come.
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| | | 117 | Boldwin
ID: 85241823
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 03:40
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The hard-line muslims are similarly having a lot of success recruiting blacks in our prison system.
It's an interesting and serious problem but what is your solution? Empty the USA prisons?
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| | | 118 | Boxman
ID: 337352111
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 06:26
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After the recent Supreme Court ruling, I wouldn't worry about Gitmo attendees anymore. Fresh fish will be headed to an Egyptian dungeon never to be seen again instead. That'll cure the recruitment drive.
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| | | 119 | Tree
ID: 25536195
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 06:46
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The hard-line muslims are similarly having a lot of success recruiting blacks in our prison system.
It's an interesting and serious problem but what is your solution? Empty the USA prisons?
that's a whole other thread, but in a nutshell, we could stop using our criminal justice system as a minor leagues to keep private prisons in business.
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| | | 120 | Perm Dude
ID: 195231910
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 11:24
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Wonder how successful those Muslims would be in "recruiting" if we limited our incarcerations to those charged with a crime?
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| | | 121 | Boldwin
ID: 85241823
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 11:29
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I believe we are already doing that in the USA prison system and it's not working there so why would it work in Guantanamo?
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| | | 122 | Tree
ID: 3533298
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 12:37
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considering Baldwin's background and the purple triangle some of his people were forced to wear 65 years ago, it almost sickens me how quickly he is to persecute people of a different religious belief for no other reason than that different religious belief.
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| | | 123 | sarge33rd
ID: 99331714
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 12:46
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I believe we are already doing that in the USA prison system and it's not working there so why would it work in Guantanamo?
Did I read that correctly? Why bother with charges??? That, from someone who purports to support the US Constitution?????????
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| | | 124 | Boldwin
ID: 85241823
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 13:24
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People fighting out of uniform logically deserve the traditional punishment handed out to spies. I don't know if that description fits every person in Guantanamo but when it does in my mind all talk of charges, civilian courts, and Geneva Conventions go right out the window.
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| | | 125 | sarge33rd
ID: 99331714
Thu, Jun 19, 2008, 14:04
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One has to be charged with being a spy, to be treated AS a spy. No charges...WE (as in the US) doesnt detain indefinitely w.o legal counsel and/or due process. THAT kind of thing, is the purvue of Nazism and other utterly fascist regimes.
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